Naslov
Ignorance, Involuntariness, and Regret in Aristotle

Autori
Grgić, Filip

Izvornik
International journal of philosophical studies (0967-2559) 29 (2021), 3; 351-369

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Radovi u časopisima, članak, znanstveni

Ključne riječi
Aristotle ; involuntary and voluntary actions ; ignorance ; pain ; regret

Sažetak
This paper is a discussion of Aristotle’s account of actions that come about because of ignorance as found in his Nicomachean Ethics 3.1. I argue that such actions do not originate in the agent, but can rather be seen as a subclass of lucky events. Aristotle makes a distinction between two types of actions that come about because of ignorance: those that are painful or regretted (involuntary actions) and those that are not (non-voluntary actions). I argue that involuntary actions that come about because of ignorance are painful for basically the same reason as forced actions. They include the mismatch between the person’s capacity as the agent and the fact that it happened to her that she did something even though, qua agent, she contributed nothing, so that she is reduced, as it were, to the mere vehicle of luck.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Filozofija

POVEZANOST RADA