Pregled bibliografske jedinice broj: 1091388
Institucije neposredne demokracije u mreži političkog, pravnog i populističkog konstitucionalizma
Institucije neposredne demokracije u mreži političkog, pravnog i populističkog konstitucionalizma // Rad Hrvat. akad. znan. i umjet. Razred za druš. znan. 54=539(2019) : 1-32, 54 (2019), 539; 1-32 doi:10.21857/y54jofpv1m (domaća recenzija, članak, znanstveni)
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Naslov
Institucije neposredne demokracije u mreži političkog, pravnog i populističkog konstitucionalizma
(Institutions of Direct Democracy in the Network of Political, Legal and Populistic Constitutionalism)
Autori
Bačić, Arsen
Izvornik
Rad Hrvat. akad. znan. i umjet. Razred za druš. znan. 54=539(2019) : 1-32 (1330-0768) 54
(2019), 539;
1-32
Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Radovi u časopisima, članak, znanstveni
Ključne riječi
predstavnički sustav ; neposredna demokracija ; referendum ; populizam ; Ustavni sud.
(representative system ; direct democracy ; referendum ; populism ; Constitutional Court.)
Sažetak
This text is about the place, role and relation of the representative system and direct democracywithin the triad of political, legal and populistic consti-tutionalism. Also, it is directed at constitutional-theoretical and political apo-logy of constitution and constitutionalism. This is in particular at the role of constitutional judiciary within the context of the reasons and limits of using institutions of direct democracy within the constitutional democratic organi-sation of contemporary government powers. It, in particular, sets out the rea-sons for which, according to the author, constitutional democratic understan-ding of the text of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia does not register low frequencies of warning calls of recent referendum initiatives. Concretely, they are those which aim at change to art. 72 of the Constitution – number of representatives in Croatian parliament and amendments to Constitution art. 72a - on taking away the voting rights for national minority representatives to vote on confidence to the government and budget. It is the author’s conclusi-on that it is about attempts to constitutionalise reductionistic anti-egalitarian ideas of actual populistic Sturm und Drang. In this and similar contexts, the Constitutional Court acquires the imperative task of defending constitutional values from excessive activism and from both various demagogically-conser-vative groups and bureaucratic and indifferent party formations of Croatian representative democracy
Izvorni jezik
Hrvatski
