Pregled bibliografske jedinice broj: 1048283
Epistemic Peerhood and the Procedural Epistemic Value of Deliberation: Rejecting Second- Personal Epistemic Authority
Epistemic Peerhood and the Procedural Epistemic Value of Deliberation: Rejecting Second- Personal Epistemic Authority // Summer school Equality and Citizenship 2016
Rijeka, Hrvatska, 2016. (predavanje, domaća recenzija, neobjavljeni rad, znanstveni)
CROSBI ID: 1048283 Za ispravke kontaktirajte CROSBI podršku putem web obrasca
Naslov
Epistemic Peerhood and the Procedural Epistemic Value of Deliberation: Rejecting Second- Personal Epistemic Authority
(Epistemic Peerhood and the Procedural Epistemic Value of Deliberation: Rejecting Second-Personal Epistemic Authority)
Autori
Cerovac, Ivan
Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Sažeci sa skupova, neobjavljeni rad, znanstveni
Skup
Summer school Equality and Citizenship 2016
Mjesto i datum
Rijeka, Hrvatska, 06.06.2016. - 10.06.2016
Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje
Vrsta recenzije
Domaća recenzija
Ključne riječi
Darwall, Epistemic peerhood, Peter, Second-personal reasons, Legitimacy, Epistemic democracy
Sažetak
The paper offers a comprehensive critique of Peter's approach to political legitimacy. While Peter argues that, in the conditions when two persons are equally likely to make a mistake (when they are epistemic peers), they should not be accountable to the truth but only to each other, the paper claims that the very notion of epistemic peerhood requires some appeal to the truth. Namely, if epistemic peers are defined as people who are equally likely to make a mistake, they are defines according to some procedure-independent criterion (i.e. their ability to get to the correct answer).
Izvorni jezik
Engleski
Znanstvena područja
Filozofija