ࡱ> +.&'()*bjbj-- 4OORr DDDXXX8||XV $ $ !!!$>8 D!!!!!8L$ p A!dD D !V@Z gO  W0*0 ZZD !!!!!!!88}!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! :Ivan Padjen( REINVENTING SYSTEMATIC INTERPRETATION: CRITERIA AND USES OF THE TRIPARTITION INTO PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND SOCIAL LAW ( The problem of the paper is indicated by the following appraisals. The first was made by Ruth Wedgwood at a conference on command responsibility in 2001. Her argument ran, roughly, as follows: When a German judge has applied his 500 concepts to facts of a criminal case, he is left with the discretion to sentence the defendant from three and a half to five years of imprisonment; when an American judge has applied all of his 50 concepts, he is left with the discretion between 0 and 20 years of imprisonment. The second is Francisco Martin's theory that the US constitution originally was, and has remained till this very day, an international treaty. The third appraisal was made by Philip Allott in characterizing Thomas Frank's life work as a collosal attempt to export liberal democracy by international law. Allott analyzed seven meanings of liberal democracy to conclude that the meaning, if any, the Founding Fathers had in mind was that the government should protect the minority of the oppulent against the majority. 1.1. Colonization The moral of the findings is that it is not necessarily the best policy to apply American - including Anglo-American jurisprudential remedies to continental European legal problems. American law, as well as Anglo-American Common Law in general, does not have properties comparable to that of continental European law, that is, Civil Law, which both directs and limits officials to render relatively predictable legal decisions. Bold constitutional interpretations rendered by US federal courts, which may be justified by the rigidity of the US Constitution as an international enactment, would be often a violation of constitutionality in continental European continental legal systems, including both the EU law and the European Convention of Human Rights. Redistribution of wealth, which may be justified by considerations of economic efficinency as well as of political equality, can be instituted best, as demonstrated by the US developments culminating in the New Deal, with little or no judicial review. The reason why continental European legal scholars nonetheless invoke American jurisprudence as a remedy to continental European legal problems is, as suggested by the title of this section, colonialism. American legal theory, as a part and parcel of Anglo-American thinking, is less imposed on than self-imposed by Continentals. Thus legal scholars as well as other social scientists and even academics in humanities in Central and Eastern Europe have adopted largely anglicized criteria of scholarly excellence, such as Web of Science Core Collection and Scopus. The most pathetic development in the same area, which belongs to the Austrian and/or German civil law tradition, are professsors of civil law who do not read German let alone French or Italian. The submission to the Anglo-American academic culture can be seen also as a reflection of intellectual, political and economic conditions. Continental European legal philosophy in the aftermath of the II World War was split between the still dominant legal positivism, which denied the very possibility of practical philosophy, and a revived legal naturalism, which had little if any impact on legal practice. American constitutional jurisprudence was an indispensable guideline at the time Germany and Italy adopted, largely as a result of American victory in the II World War, constitutional complaint. American federalism was of interest to Europeans by virtue of the fact that the European Union has been, or at least had been till Brexit, the United States of Europe in statu nascendi. A far more important reason, or cause, of the assimilation of the Anglo-American academic culture, as well as of everything else Anglo-American, in the past three or four decades is globalization. 1.2. Re-Systematization Contrary to the expectations the foregoing remarks may have generated, this paper, as well as a series of studies to which it belongs, is advocating adoption but with adaptation of a distinctly American theory. It is Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal's policy oriented or configurative jurisprudence (hereinafter: POJ). The reason for adopting POJ is that application of law always includes creation, that is, law-making, and POJ is a theory of law-making. Application of law includes creation in that even in the simplest adjudication, such as small claim or misdemeanor proceedings, the most complex task is not de lege lata. It is de lege ferenda, that is, policy-making. It is within the limits of law rather than by naked force. Nonetheless, adjudication is also a point where law and politics are inseparable. POJ can guide creation of law because it is a highly articulated theory de lege ferenda, which is arguably the best framework for legislating and administrating social change, as well as for adjudicating hard cases. The reason for adaptating POJ is that POJ has criticized and rejected conventional legal concepts, including legal norms, division of laws, and, by implication, legal systems. By doing so POJ has denied not only the requirement that law be created within its own limits but also the idea of order, which is the centrepiece of legal philosophy. Hence POJ should be adapted to include legal system, which is presupposed by systematic interpretation of law. While systematization of law is the strongest side of continental European laws, its heyday was the 18th and 19th century. A revival of interest in the subject in German, French and English literature in the late 20th century has been concerned primarily with, in Razs terms, the structure, less with the existence and identity, and only occasionally with the content of legal systems. Studies of the content have been concerned more with the unity than the division of law. Moreover, contemporary studies on the division into public law and private law tend to either deny it, sometimes by treating it as a positive rather than an extra-positive legal criterion, or hypostasize it, by treating private law as a transcendent substance. The idea of social law, which used to be a major problem of legal theory in the first half of the 20th century, has almost vanished. The paper is reconstructing a crucial aspect of the continental European conceptions of legal system. It is a re-systematization of the tripartition of law into public law, private law, and social law on the basis of criteria derived from Aristotles analysis of justice Concepts about man and society, like the ones analysed in the paper, are essentially contested. Hence the paper is developing its concepts as ideal types that are composed of building blocks of more prominent conceptions and, at the same time, used against them. As ideal types the conceptions do not have a truth value. They are measuring devices that direct attention in the study of society. But by doing so they may shed a new light on, and link in unexpected ways, familiar phenomena and thus provoke thought and action. The usefulness of the tripartition in systematic interpretation of law is exemplified by the status of associations and the claim that the right to marry is a human right. Systematic interpretation is used here in the sense of learning the meaning of a law from legal context. It is even broader than logical interpretation in a common French usage. The latter includes interpretation that takes into account history, purpose and context, each of which is a distinct criterion in German law (the latter includes also extra-legal values as a criterion of interpretation). Systematic interpretation in the sense used here includes also a part of gramatical interpretation in the common French usage, namely, learning the meaning of a law from legal context. The opposite of the systematic interpretation is learning the meaning of a law from its non-legal context. The latter includes, in addition to the everyday language in its ordinary or stock uses, extra-legal values (e.g. moral, political) and extra-legal technical expressions (e.g. scientific, medical, financial). Criteria of systematization of law consist of three interdependent sets. On the one hand, there are criteria of positive law, such as the division of a statute into sections, articles, chapters, parts etc., which are informed by meta-positive criteria. On the other, there are meta-positive criteria, most notably of the division and unity of law, which are informed by positive law. Although the meta-positive criteria rely heavily on extra-positive considerations , the fact that the former are interdependent with positive criteria makes both genuinely legal in that they cannot be substituted for by extra-legal criteria, namely the ones that pertain to, for instance, linguistics, philosophy or sociology. To indicate what is meant by meta-positive criteria of division of law it may be convenient to list here the following inter-relations within law that presuppose such criteria: a legal entity (e.g. a legal rule, a right, legal institute, a legal branch etc.): a legal system (e.g. Slovenian, EU, international); a legal rule: a legal value: a legal principle; objective law (the law): subjective law (a right); absolute law: relative law; property (patrimonial) law: non-property (non-patrimonial) law; primary law: secondary law; substantive (material) law: procedural (formal) law; public law: private law; state law: social law; intra-systemic law (sp. a national law): trans-systemic law (esp. private international law): inter-systemic law (sp. early modern international law); criminal responsibility/law: civil responsibility/law: disciplinary responsibility/law; political responsibility/law. The following sets of arguments are meant to be original contributions to legal scholarship, most notably to legal theory: the formation and use of concepts of legal scholarship as ideal types (section 1.2 ff); the reinterpretation of Aristotles analysis of justice that distinguishes, first, establishing justice and corrective justice and, secondly, three functions of corrective justice, namely, criminal, civil and public corrective justice (section 2.1); the reconceptualization of the distinction between public law and private law (section 2.2); the reconceptualization of social law as a type of law between public law and private law (section 2.3); the distinctions between politics, economy, law and other social groups on the basis of the tripartiton of law into public, private and social law (section 2.4). The arguments on the status of associations and the claim that there is a human right to marriage are meant to be preliminary communications (section 3). 2. Criteria Criteria for distinguishing public law and private law can be derived from Aristotles analysis of justice. It has been transferred to modernity by scholastic scholarship.  The reason is that scholasticism is common sense made pedantic. Hence it has a greater power to explain law than modern philosophy. As Gordley has put it, if what are ultimately Aristotelian concepts explain our own law, which is rapidly becoming the law of the world, we should ask why these concepts work so well. The derivation of criteria for distinguishing public law and private law consists of four steps. First, Aristotles analysis is used to identify four functions of justice, namely, distributive and commutative as establishing justice and several functions of corrective justice. Secondly, the distinction between distributive and commutative justice is used to back the traditional distinction between public law and private law. The latter distinction explains in turn why distributive and commutative justice are two functions rather than mutually exclusive forms. Thirdly, Aristotle s (apocryphal? ) conception of oikonomia (0) backs another traditional concept that is relevant to modern legal orders, namely, that of social law, thus completing the division of laws into a tripartition of private, public and social law. Fourthly, since the identification of a social phenomenon is made by a reference to the reasons and/or rules that constitute the phenomenon, and modern societies are constituted by modern law, the identification of modern polities, economies and many social groups, such as religious communities and even social classes, is made by reference to legal reasons and/or rules. 2.1.Functions of Justice According to Aristotle,  the just (man .- I.P.) is the lawful and the equal, the unjust the unlawful and the unequal   (T)he best man is not he who exercises his excellence (; hereinafter: virtue) towards himself but he who exercises it towards anotherJustice in this sense, then, is not a part of virtue but virtue entire. Justice can be also a part of virtue. Justice which is a part of virtue is always a proportion. The justinvolves at least four terms; for the persons for whom it is in fact just are two, and the things in which it is manifested, the objects, are two. Distributive justice is that which is manifested in distributions of honour or money or the other things that fall to be divided among those who have a share in the constitution (for in these it is possible for one man to have a share either unequal or equal to that of another). Members of distributive justice are in geometrical proportion, which can be exemplified as follows: A (a nobleman): B (a plebeian) = C (a member of both the Upper Hose and the Lower House; pays a tax of 2 ducats a year; serves in the military as an aequestrian officer): D (a member of the Lower House only; pays a tax of 1 ducat a year; serves in the military as a soldier on foot). (A)ll men agree that what is just in distribution must be according to merit in some sense, though they do not all specify the same sort of merit, but democrats identify it with the status of freeman, supporters of oligarchy with wealth (or with noble birth), and supporters of aristocracy with virtue. Commutative justice, justice of exchange or commercial justice is secured by cross-conjunction and consists in having an equal amount before and after transaction. Hence members of commutative justice are in arithmetic proportion, as demonstrated by the following example: Let A be a builder, B a shoemaker, C a house, D a shoe. The builder, then, must get from the shoemaker the latter's work, and must himself give him in return his own. If, then, first there is proportionate equality of goods, and then reciprocal action takes place, the result we mention will be effected, if not, the bargain is not equal, and does not hold; for there is nothing to prevent the work of the one being better than that of the other; they must therefore be equated For it is not two doctors that associate their exchange, but a doctor and a farmer, or in general people who are different and unequal; but these must be equated. This is why all things that are exchanged must be somehow commensurable. It is for this end that money has been introduced, and it becomes n a sense an intermediate. Aristotle's idea of corrective, rectifying or remedial justice is encapsulated in the passage that begins with the division of particular justice into two kinds, the first kind being distributive justice. The passage continues as follows: another kind is that which plays a rectifying part in transactions. Of this there are two divisions; of transactions some are voluntary and others involuntary voluntary such transactions as sale, purchase, usury, pledging, lending, depositing, letting (they are called voluntary because the origin of these transactions is voluntary), while of the involuntary some are clandestine, such as theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticement of slaves, assassination, false witness, and others are violent, such as assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery with violence, mutilation, abuse, insult. Aristotles passage that analyses corrective justice and commutative justice allows more than one interpretation. The first is that Aristotle, in fact conflates not only commutative justice, which is regulated by the law of contracts, and corrective justice, which is regulated by the law of torts, but also torts and crimes, while dividing the latter two into an obsolete pair of wrongs involving fraud and wrongs involving force. Aristotle could be excused for the failure to distinguish between contracts and torts, since he experienced primitive law only. However, if Aristotle was bound to fail it is bewildering that his alleged confusion is reiterated, even without a reference to his work, in contemporary legal scholarship. Thus the opening pages entitled Contract and Tort of the volume on contracts in the most ambitious modern encyclopaedia of comparative law treat the two institutes as legal equivalents. In addition, the division of wrongs into force and fraud is a central issue of contemporary libertarian debate. Hence a more plausible interpretation is that Aristotle, rather than confusing contracts and torts, recognized that members of both are in arithmetic proportion and for that reason can be used interchangeably: the breach of a contractual obligation gives rise to tortuous liability, which can be remedied not only by a judgement but also by a contract. Distributive justice and commutative justice have something in common. They both consist in giving to each member of a social group (which may consist of two members only) a benefit or burden that the member deserves but has not yet been given. Hence they are labelled here establishing justice. They differ from corrective justice, which consists in giving to each member of a social group a benefit or burden that the member deserves and had been given but has lost later on by a wrong. In addition to distinguishing commutative and corrective justice, Aristotle recognized that members of corrective justice in criminal law need not be in arithmetic proportion. In that he differed from the Pythagoreans, who defined justice without qualification as reciprocityfor in many they are not in accord, e.g. if an official has inflicted a wound, he should not be wounded in return, and if someone has wounded an official, he ought not to be wounded only but punished in addition. Further, there is a great difference between a voluntary and involuntary act. These remarks suggest that corrective justice in criminal law is, like distributive justice, a geometrical proportion. The ground of the proportion has meanwhile changed. In modern criminal law criminal sanction is proportional to the perpetrators guilt (mens rea) and victims harm. However, corrective justice in criminal law is still geometrical proportion. In addition, the remarks demonstrate that Aristotle recognized similarities and dissimilarities between civil law and criminal law as well as between commutative and corrective justice. The fact that Aristotle distinguished corrective justice in criminal law from corrective justice in civil law has prompted the interpretation that Aristotle recognized restorative or punitive justice as distinct from corrective justice.  However it has been commonly overlooked that Aristotle reported on still another form of justice. It is the graphe paranomon ( ), that is, constitutional adjudication in Athenian democracy. It is true that Aristotle neither analysed proportion of the members of graphe paranomon nor identified it as an instance of justice. Nonetheless, it is obvious that the annulment of a statute and the restoration of the value infringed upon by implementing the statue is comparable to the annulment of a contract and the restoration of the value infringed upon by performing the contract. What requires a further analysis is, first, the relation of administrative adjudication to constitutional adjudication and, secondly, the proportion of members of the last two mentioned functions of adjudication. Even withouth a further analysis the foregoing remarks allow the conclusion: following Aristotle, there are in modern legal systems, in addition to two functions of establishing justice, at least three forms of corrective justice, namely, the civil one, which corrects violations of commutative justice, the constitutional one, which corrects violations of distributive justice, and the punitive or restorative one, which corrects grave violations of both distributive and commutative justice. In modern legal system there is also administrative corrective justice but it does not follow directly from Aristotle's analysis. Aristotle's analysis of equity (((((((((, (((((((; aequitas, aequum) as distinct from justice ((((((((((, ((((((; justitia, justum) may seem unrelated to functions of justice. However, Aristotle's own definition reveals that equity, as a correction of legal justice, especially in the application of a law, may change the proportion of members of a social group and the benefits or burdens they are entitled to. The definition runs as follows: When the law speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it which is not covered by the universal statement, then it is right, when the legislator fails us and has erred by over-simplicity, to correct the omission to say what the legislator himself would hae said had he been present, and would have p ut into his law if he had known. 2.2. Public Law and Private Law The second step is a reminder, or a demonstration, that the distinction between distributive and commutative justice may also be used to back the traditional distinction between public law and private law. Relying on Ulpians division, private law and public law can be distinguished by the following four criteria: interests, subjects, objects, bindingness. Thus public law serves interests of a legal system, while private law serves interests of the parties to a legal relationship. The addressor of public law is a legal system without legal capacity such as the international community, or a public law subject, which need not but may be a legal system, such as a state, and may be also a private law subject with public powers. The addressee of public law is a public law subject, such as a state or a public hospital but may be also a private law subject acting in its public capacity. Likewise, the addressee of private law is a private law subject but may be also a public law person acting in its private law capacity. Public law is legally binding for its addressees without their consent, either as jus strictum or as jus dispositivum, unlike private law, which binds is addressees only with their consent. Public law and private law are conceived here as poles or functions of a legal system rather than as two mutually exclusive sub-systems of a legal system. The reason why a legal system has both functions is the experience that law includes both heteronomy and autonomy. Hence in many and perhaps most or even all legal relations there is both a public law component and a private law component. For instance, the building permit issuance is an administrative legal relationship between the state or a local community that is issuing the permit, on the one side, and a person requesting the permit, on the other. Although the relationship belongs primarily to public law it has a significant private law component in that the permit can be issued to an addressee only with consent of the latter. Public procurement is a public law relationship that includes components of a sale of goods, that is, of a paradigmatic private law relationship. A navy vessel can acquire supplies only by public procurement.There are also public powers that can be exercised exceptionally by private persons and private powers that can be exercised by public persons. Thus a citizen who is not a sworn law-enforcement official can make a citizens arrest. The cook of a navy vessel in emergency is allowed to shop in green market on behalf of the state. The distinction between public law and private law stated above can be refined by three additional sets of criteria. The first links the dichotomy of public and private law with the dichotomy of establishing and corrective law. While public establishing law includes legislation, that is, the making of constitutions, statutes, decrees, customs etc., public corrective law includes constitutional, administrative and the bulk of criminal adjudication. Likewise, private establishing law includes contracting, while private corrective law includes adjudicating. The second set identifies paradigmatic law creating acts, that is, legal acts that achieve most congenially a function of law. While the paradigmatic establishing distributive act is a statute (in the sense of lex, la loi, das Gesetz), the paradigmatic corrective distributive act is a constitutional judgment. A function of law can be achieved often by more than one act. For instance, a contract is the paradigmatic establishing commutative act but it can be used also to achieve ends of legislation, for instance in collective bargaining or in international law, and also to achieve ends of adjudication, for instance by settling a dispute. It is precisely the interchangeability of even paradigmatic legal acts that explains why distributive and commutative justice, or public and private law, are not mutually exclusive forms but functions of law. The third and for the purpose at hand the most important set consists of criteria that, following Radbruch and partly Ripert, link public law to distributive justice and private law to commutative justice. According to the third set, public law regulates the distribution of public benefits and burdens among public law subjects of a legal system on the basis of their merit, while private law regulates the exchange of private goods between private law subjects on the basis of market value of the goods. 2.3 Social Law The third step in deriving criteria for distinguishing public law and private law is a reminder of Aristotles (apocryphal? ) oikonomia (0), that is household management. It may back another traditional concept that is relevant to modern legal orders, namely, that of social law, thus completing the division of laws into a tripartition of private law, public law and social law. Social law is first and foremost the order of an extended family, which can still be found in many societies. But instances of social law are also autonomous legal orders of the many social groups, such as religious communities (other than the Catholic Church), trades and professions, merchants and markets, universities, cities and local communities, end even modern international law. For the purpose at hand social law is defined as a legal order that is no longer private and not yet public, that is, sovereign or, at least, superior. The definition implies that, on the one hand, a social law presents particular interests it serves as universal interests; and, on the other, the public law that is superior to a social law recognizes the interests the latter serves as universal and, as such, a common good of the wider community whose interests are served in principle by the public law. Hence the concept of social law is intimately related to conceptions of society which maintain that a certain social group, such as the clergy according to the late medieval Christian doctrine or the proletariat according to Marxism or banks according to neoliberalism, are structured to be the agent of the community it belongs to and thereby its organ. 2.4. Law as Constitutive The fourth and final step is the following line of arguments: since the identification of a social phenomenon is made by a reference to the rules and/or other reasons that constitute the phenomenon, or merely regulate it, and modern societies are constituted by modern law, the identification of modern polities, economies and many social groups, such as religious communities, is made by reference to legal reasons and/or rules; hence: public law is a definiens of polity, of policy (since law is the most important policy) and even of a considerable part of politics; private law is a constituent of economy; while social laws are definientes of social groups such as religious and local communities, trades etc. The argument does not imply any of the following: first, that there is a separation between politics, economy etc.; secondly, that a polity, an economy, a church or a school is defined and therefore can be identified by legal rules only. But the argument does imply the following: first, while there is no politics without economy and vice versa, by virtue of the distinction that considers public law and private law, and also social law, as directions rather than entities, there are social groups that are primarily economic or primarily political etc.; secondly, although such groups are determined not only by standards of conduct and other reasons for action but also by causes or laws, most notably psychological and economic laws, when the legal and other social standards that are supposed to constitute or even merely regulate a social group are secret and/or inefficacious, not only legal but also empirical inquiries into that group are sterile. 3. Uses The usefulness of the re-conceptualization of the tripartion of law into public, private and social law can be in this paper, given its constraints, only indicated by a summary analysis of the status of associations and the claim that the right to marry is a human right. 3.1. Associations The following provisions of Croatian legislation imply that an association with juridical personality (hereinafter also: a registered association) is a typical not-for-profit entity of social law whose mission is promotion of social well-being (comp. section 2.3): the Law on Associations (hereinafter also as LoA) provision that non-registered associations are subject to regulations on partnership (Article 1) and the Croatian Law on Obligations, which as the sedes materiae - regulates partnership as primarily a proprietory institution (Articles 637-660); LoA objective to create preconditions for efficient/efficacious financing of the programs and projects of interest to common good (Article 2; emphasis added), the LoA definition of a registered association as benefiting either its members or non-members or both (Article 4). Despite the implication of Croatian legislation that the registered association is a not-for-profit entity of social law whose mission is promotion of social well-being, interests are recognized by public law as universal, the leading Croatian treatise on societies categorizes the registered association as a society, that is, an entity of private law akin to commercial societies. The practical problem is that the Croatian Law on Financial Affairs and Accounting of Not-for-Profit Organizations (hereinafter: LoFAANPO) requires all the registered associations to keep demanding financial records. The requirements hamper financially weaker associations to maintain their registration and thus the status that qualifies them to apply to government and other sources for financial support. The objective of the requirements is allegedly audit of the leading Croatian professional soccer team registered as an association. The incorporation of for-profit organizations as associations and similar entities whose mission is social well-being is a widespread practice. As a result of commercialization, juridical persons, which were in the early modern civil law in the 19th century legitimate only as fictions, have gained by the mid 20th century the capacity to acquire in principle all the rights inlcuding even human rights available to natural persons, while the distinction between for-profit juridical persons and not-for-profit juridical persons has lost much of its significance. A case in point is the reincorporation of the global accountancy network Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu in 2010, which has 169,000 staff around the world and is vying with PricewaterhouseCoopers for the title of the world's biggest professional services group. The group quit in 2010 its previous status as an obscure Swiss entity known as a  HYPERLINK "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_Verein" \o "Wikipedia: Swiss Verein" Verein a membership structure originally intended for sports clubs, voluntary organisations and unions. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu changed its status into as private company under UK law. A social law is by definition (section 2.3) hardly comparable with other social laws existing simultaneously under the same superior public law and/or legal order, and even less with social laws under other sovereigns. In view of that fact, it is not surprising that a leading comparative lawyer has criticized the International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol. XIII Business and Private Organizations, inter alia for creating and using the term personal business association to lump together incompatible institutions. 3.2. Equality The tripartion into public law, private law and social law may provide a fresh look at the claim that the right to marry is a human right and that a denial of the right is a violation of the human right to equality. To make the long argument digestible, it should suffice to note here that if the right to marry is a human right a denial of that right to a juridical persons for instance, to Croatian Railways, which excell in family care for its employees more than in driving trains is also a vioalation of human right. Abstract The problem of the paper is indicated by Ruth Wedgwood's appraisal at a conference on international criminal law in 2001: when a German judge has applied his 500 concepts to facts of a criminal case, he is left with the discretion to sentence the defendant from three and a half to five years of imprisonment; when an American judge has applied all of his 50 concepts, he is left with the discretion between 0 and 20 years of imprisonment. Contrary to the expectations the citation above may have generated, the paper is advocating adoption but with adaptation - of a distinctly American theory. It is Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal's policy oriented or configurative jurisprudence (POJ). It is a higly articulated theory de lege ferenda, which is arguably the best framework available for legislating and administrating social change and adjudicating hard cases. However, POJ is inadequate as a framework for systematic interpretation of law, which is genuinely legal in two senses: unlike other standard canons or methods of interpretation, it relies primarily on legal criteria; it cannot be substituted for by criteria of another discipline, such as linguistics. The paper is reconstructing a crucial aspect of continental European conceptions of a legal system. It is the tripartition into public, private and social law on the basis of criteria derived from Aristotles analysis of justice. The usefulness of the tripartition in systematic interpretation of law is exemplified by the status of associations and the claim that the right to marry is a human right.     PAGE \* MERGEFORMAT1 Padjen ReinvSystInterp 30.06.2017..23.59  ( professor of law, senior fellow in political science, Faculty of Law, University of Rijeka, Hahlic 6, HR-Rijeka, Croatia. E-mail: ivan.padjen@zg.t-com.hr ( An earlier version of the paper was submitted to Modern Legal Interpretation: Legalism or Beyond? 8th Conference on Legal Theory, Legal Argumentation and Legal Philosophy (sponsors: European Faculty of Law & School of Government and European Studies; Ljubljana, 18-19 November 2016).  At the Conference Command Responsibility(sponsors: Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights & Croatian Law Centre; convenors: Zarko Puhovski and Ivan Padjen; Hotel  Coning , Trakoaan near Zagreb, 23-24 March 2001). 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B., Essentially Contested Concepts, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 56 (1956). Gordley, James, Foundations of Private Law: Property, Tort, Contract, Unjust Enrichment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Gurvitch, Georges, L'Ide du droit social: Notion et systme du droit social; Histoire doctrinale depuis le XVIIe sicle jusqu'a la fin de XIXe sicle (Paris: Sirey, 1932). Hallis, Frederick, Corporate Personality: A Study in Jurisprudence (London: Oxford University Press, 1930). Hamburger, Max, Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotles Legal Theory (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1951). Kelsen, Hans, General Theory of Law and State, trans. (New York: Russell & Russell, 1961), 201-207; Kerchove, Michel van den, et Ost, Francois, Le systme juridique entre ordre et dsordre (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1988). Keyt, D., Aristotles Theory of Distributive Justice, in Id., and Miller, F. D. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotles Politics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 238-78. Lali Novak, G., and Padjen, I.,  Europeanisation of Asylum: From Sovereignty via Harmony to Unity , Politi ka misao / Croatian Political Science Review, vol. 46, no. 5 (2009), 75-101. Lasswell, H. D., and McDougal, M. S.,  Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, Yale Law Journal, vol. 52 (1943), 203-95, sp. at 233-36. Lasswell, Harold D., and McDougal, Myres S., Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in Law, Science and Policy, 2 vols. (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1992). Loeb, Arthur, Oeffentliches Recht Privatrecht Sozialrecht: Ein Dreiteilung im Rechtssystem (Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultaet der Universitaet Frankfurt a. M.: Dissertation, 1930; Bochum-Langendreer: Poepiaghaus, 1930). McDougal, Myres S. and Associates, Studies in World Public Order (1960); Macdougal, Myres S. Feliciano, Florentino P., Law and Minimum World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of International Coercion (1961) repr. as The International Law of War: Transnational Coercion and World Public Order (New Haven CT: New Haven Press & Dordrecht NL: Nijhoff, 1986); McDougal, Myres S. / Burke, William T., The Public Order of the Oceans: A Contemporary International Law of the Sea (1962); McDougal, Myres S. / Lasswell, Harold D., and Vlaai, Ivan, Law and Public Order in Space (1963); McDougal, Myres S. / Lasswell, Harold D., Miller, J. C., The Interpretation of International Agreements and World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure (1967), repr. (New Haven CT: New Haven Press & Dordrecht NL: Nijhoff, 1994); McDougal, Myres S. / Lasswell, Harold D., Chen, Lung-chu, Human Rights and World Public Order: Basic Policies of an International Law of Human Dignity (1980). McDougal, Myres S. Reisman, W. Michael: International Law in Contemporary Perspective (Mineola NY: The Foundation Press, 1981); International Law Essays: A Supplement to International Law in Contemporary Perspective (Mineola NY: The Foundation Press, 1981). Mehren, A. v., A General View of Contracts, in Id. (ch. ed.), Volume VII. Contracts in General, in R. David (gen. ed.), International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Tuebingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1982). Mogens, Herman H., The Athenian Democracy in the age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles, and Ideology (Norman OK: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), at 205-11. Padjen, I.: Law and Religion in Post-Modernity: Dilemmas Prompted by the Croatian Catholic University, in Polzer, M. et al. (eds.), Religion and European Integration: Religion as a Factor of Stability and Development in South Eastern Europe (Weimar: The European Academy of Sciences and Arts - Edition Weimar, 2007), 377-98; Padjen, I.: Catholic Theology in Croatian Universities: Between the Constitution and the Treaty; A Policy Oriented Inquiry, in Vukas, B., and `oai, T. (eds.), International Law: New Actors, New Concepts, Continuing Dilemmas: Liber Amicorum Bo~idar Bakotic (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2009), 13-40.; Religious Rights in Croatia: Padjen, I.:  Politi ke stranke kao javnopravne osobe hrvatskoga pravnog sistema: pristup problemu , Politi ka misao, vol. 39, no. 2 (2002), 133-155, summary:  Political Parties as Public Law Persons of the Croatian Legal System: An Approach to the Problem , 155;  Javno pravo i privatno pravo: transfer pravnih teorija , Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu, god. 44, no. 3-4 (2007), 443-61, summary: Public Law and Private Law: Transfer of Theories, 461. Padjen, I.,Pravne pretpostavke modernih drutvenih znanosti, Nae teme, 32:7-8 (1988), 1875-1890, summary Legal Presuppositions of Modern Social Sciences, 2070. Paust, J. J., The Concept of Norm: A Consideration of the Jurisprudential Views of Hart, Kelsen, and McDougal-Lasswell, Temple Law Quarterly, vol. 52, no. 1 (1979), 9-50. Peine, Freanz-Joseph, Das Recht als System (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1983). Peri, Berislav, Problem autonomije- heteronomije u pravu <Problem of autonomy and heteronomy in law> (Pravni fakultet Sveu iliata u Zagrebu: dr. diss., 1955). Bloch, Ernst, Naturrecht und menschliche Wuerde (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch, 1972), at 242. Perry, R., The Third Form of Justice: Book Review of Izhak Englard, Corrective Justice and Distributive Justice: From Aristotle to Modern Times (Oxford University Press, 2009), 256 pp., Canadian Journal of Jurisprudence, vol. 23 (2010), 233-47. Radbruch, Gustav, Rechtsphilosophie, 8. Aufl. v.Wolf, E., und Schneider, H.-P. (Stuttgart: Koehler, 1973). Raz, Joseph, The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). Reisman, Michael W., The Law in Brief Encounters (New Haven Press, 2000). Ripert, Georges, Le Declin du droit: Etudes sur la legislation contemporaine (Paris: Librairie generale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1949), at 39. Ryle, Gilbert, Ordinary Language, The Philosophical Review, vol. 62, no. 2 (1953), 167-86. Saegesser, Barbara Der Idealtypus Max Webers und der Naturwissenschaftliche Modellbegriff: Ein begriffskritischer Versuch (Basel: Birkhaeuser, 1975). Schmidt, Detlef, Die Unterscheidung von privatem und oeffentlichem Recht (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1985). Schmidt, Karsten (Hg.), Vielfalt des Rechts Einheit der Rechtsordnung?: Hamburger Ringvorlesung (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994); Seidler, G., Die Grundidee der Rechtsphilosophie, Archiv fuer Rechts-und Sozialpilosophie, Bd. 64, H. 2 (1978), 145-61. Szladits, Charles., II.The Civil Law System, in International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol. 2, ch. 2 (Tuebingen: Mohr, n.d. /1974?/), 15-75. Timsit, Grard, Thmes et systmes de droit (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1986); Vanderlinden, Jacques, Comparer les droits (Diegem: Kluwer, 1995), ch. II.3 Association, compagnie, corporation et socit QUOTE  , 87-118, at 105. Vodineli, Vladimir V., Javno i privatno pravo (J.S.D. diss. 1986; Beograd: Slu~beni glasnik, 2016). Vogenauer, Stefan, Die Auslegung von Gesetzen in England und auf dem Kontinent, Bd. I (Tuebingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 234. Weber, Max,   Objektivitaet sozialwissenschaftlicher und soziopolitischer Erkenntnis, in Id., Gesammelte Aufsetze zur Wissenschatfslehre, 3. Aufl. (Tuebingen: Mohr, 1968), 146-214; Weinrib, Ernest J., The Idea of Private Law (1995.), rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). CROATIA Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske, odluka i rjeenje / Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, Decision and recognized U-I-884/1997, U-I-920/1997, U-I- 929/1997, U-I-956/1997, U-I-453/1998, U-I-149/1999. od 3. velja e 2000., obrazlo~enje II.3.4.). Zakon o financijskom poslovanju i ra unovodstvu neprofitnihorganizacija <The Law on financial affairs and accounting of not-for-profit organizations>, Narodne novine: Slu~beni list Republike Hrvatske <Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia>, 121/14, Zakon o obveznim odnosima <The Law on obligations>, Narodne novine: Slu~beni list Republike Hrvatske <Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia>, 35/05, 41/08, 125/11 etc. Zakon o udrugama <The Law on associations; hereinafter: LoA>, Narodne novine: Slu~beni list Republike Hrvatske <Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia>, 74/14. USA Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S.(2010) ####  Martin, Francisco F., The Constitution as Treaty: The International Legal Constructionist Approach to the U.S. Constitution (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  Allott, Phillip, The Emerging International Aristocracy, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 35, no. 1 (2003), 309-38, at 324.  E.g. Cushman, Barry, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution (New York: New York University Press, 1998).  E.g. Croatia, Article 17, Section 3, Pravilnik o uvjetima za izbor u znanstvena zvanja <Regulation on requirements for election to scientific ranks>, Narodne novine: Slu~beni list Republike Hrvatske < Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia>, 28/2017.  E.g. Padjen, I.: Law and Religion in Post-Modernity: Dilemmas Prompted by the Croatian Catholic University, in Polzer, M. et al. (eds.), Religion and European Integration: Religion as a Factor of Stability and Development in South Eastern Europe (Weimar: The European Academy of Sciences and Arts - Edition Weimar, 2007), 377-98; Catholic Theology in Croatian Universities: Between the Constitution and the Treaty; A Policy Oriented Inquiry, in Vukas, B., and `oai, T. (eds.), International Law: New Actors, New Concepts, Continuing Dilemmas: Liber Amicorum Bo~idar Bakotic (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2009), 13-40.; Lali Novak, G., and Padjen, I.,  Europeanisation of Asylum: From Sovereignty via Harmony to Unity , Politi ka misao / Croatian Political Science Review, vol. 46, no. 5 (2009), 75-101.  Sp. Lasswell, Harold D., and McDougal, Myres S., Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in Law, Science and Policy, 2 vols. (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1992). The ideas of Jurisprudence have been applied in the following major works authored by McDougal (hereinafter: MSM), Lasswell (hereinafter: HDL) and their associates, and published unless stated in this note otherwise by Yale University Press: MSM and Associates, Studies in World Public Order (1960); MSM ~ and Feliciano, Florentino P., Law and Minimum World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of International Coercion (1961) repr. as The International Law of War: Transnational Coercion and World Public Order (New Haven CT: New Haven Press & Dordrecht NL: Nijhoff, 1986); MSM and Burke, William T., The Public Order of the Oceans: A Contemporary International Law of the Sea (1962); MSM, HLD and Vlaai, Ivan, Law and Public Order in Space (1963); MSM, HDL and Miller, J. C., The Interpretation of International Agreements and World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure (1967), repr. (New Haven CT: New Haven Press & Dordrecht NL: Nijhoff, 1994); MSM, HDL and Chen, Lung-chu, Human Rights and World Public Order: Basic Policies of an International Law of Human Dignity (1980). Takoer MSM and Reisman, W. Michael: International Law in Contemporary Perspective (Mineola NY: The Foundation Press, 1981); International Law Essays: A Supplement to International Law in Contemporary Perspective (Mineola NY: The Foundation Press, 1981).  Kelsen, Hans, General Theory of Law and State, trans. (New York: Russell & Russell, 1961), 133-34.  Paust, J. J., The Concept of Norm: A Consideration of the Jurisprudential Views of Hart, Kelsen, and McDougal-Lasswell, Temple Law Quarterly, vol. 52, no. 1 (1979), 9-50.  Lasswell, H. D., and McDougal, M. S., Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, Yale Law Journal, vol. 52 (1943), 203-95, sp. at 233-36.  Seidler, G., Die Grundidee der Rechtsphilosophie, Archiv fuer Rechts-und Sozialpilosophie, Bd. 64, H. 2 (1978), 145-61.  V. Bjoerne, Lars, Deutsche Rechtssysteme im 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts (Ebelsbach: Gremer, 1984); Cappellini, Paolo, Systema iuris (Milano: Giuffre 1985).  Raz, Joseph, The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), at 1-2.  E.g. Alchourrn, Carlos E., and Bulygin, Eugenio, Normative Systems (Wien-New York: Springer, 1971); Peine, Freanz-Joseph, Das Recht als System (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1983); Timsit, Grard, Thmes et systmes de droit (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1986); Kerchove, Michel van den, et Ost, Francois, Le systme juridique entre ordre et dsordre (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1988).  E.g. Engisch, Karl, Die Einheit der Rechtsordnung (1935), Nachdr. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1987); Schmidt, Karsten (Hg.), Vielfalt des Rechts Einheit der Rechtsordnung?: Hamburger Ringvorlesung (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994); Baldus, Manfred, Die Einheit der Rechtsordnung: Bedeutungen einer juristischem Formel in Rechtstheorie, Zivil- und Sttrafrechtswissenschaft des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1995).  E.g. Kelsen, Hans, General Theory of Law and State, trans. (New York: Russell & Russell, 1961), 201-207; Szladits, Charles., II.The Civil Law System, in International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol. 2, ch. 2 (Tuebingen: Mohr, n.d. /1974?/), 15-75.  E.g. Vodineli, Vladimir V., Javno i privatno pravo (J.S.D. diss. 1986; Beograd: Slu~beni glasnik, 2016).  Recognized as an a priori distinction by Radbruch, Gustav, Rechtsphilosophie, 8. Aufl. v.Wolf, E., und Schneider, H.-P. (Stuttgart: Koehler, 1973), par. 16, at 220; taken as a starting point by Schmidt, Detlef, Die Unterscheidung von privatem und oeffentlichem Recht (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1985), at 23.  Weinrib, Ernest J., The Idea of Private Law (1995.), rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).  E.g. Loeb, Arthur, Oeffentliches Recht Privatrecht Sozialrecht: Ein Dreiteilung im Rechtssystem (Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultaet der Universitaet Frankfurt a. M.: Dissertation, 1930; Bochum-Langendreer: Poepiaghaus, 1930); Gurvitch, Georges, L'Ide du droit social: Notion et systme du droit social; Histoire doctrinale depuis le XVIIe sicle jusqu'a la fin de XIXe sicle (Paris: Sirey, 1932).  Reisman, Michael W., The Law in Brief Encounters (New Haven Press, 2000).  This paper draws on, but differs significantly from, Padjen, I.:  Politi ke stranke kao javnopravne osobe hrvatskoga pravnog sistema: pristup problemu , Politi ka misao, vol. 39, no. 2 (2002), 133-155, summary:  Political Parties as Public Law Persons of the Croatian Legal System: An Approach to the Problem , 155;  Javno pravo i privatno pravo: transfer pravnih teorija, Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu, god. 44, no. 3-4 (2007), 443-61, summary: Public Law and Private Law: Transfer of Theories, 461.  Gallie, W. B., Essentially Contested Concepts, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 56 (1956), 167-198.  Weber, Max, Objektivitaet sozialwissenschaftlicher und soziopolitischer Erkenntnis, in Id., Gesammelte Aufsetze zur Wissenschatfslehre, 3. Aufl. (Tuebingen: Mohr, 1968), 146-214; Saegesser, Barbara Der Idealtypus Max Webers und der Naturwissenschaftliche Modellbegriff: Ein begriffskritischer Versuch (Basel: Birkhaeuser, 1975), sp. 159-72.  Gallie, note 23, at 172, the Vth condition of an essentially contested concept.  Weber, note 24, at 193-94.  Vogenauer, Stefan, Die Auslegung von Gesetzen in England und auf dem Kontinent, Bd. I (Tuebingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 234.  Ibid., 29-48, 438-65.  Ibid., 235.  Roughly in the sense of Ryle, Gilbert, Ordinary Language, The Philosophical Review, vol. 62, no. 2 (1953), 167-86.  Padjen,  Politi ke stranke and   Javno pravo , note 22.  Izhak Englard, Corrective and Distributive Justice: From Aristotle to Modern Times (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).  William James, quoted by Gordley, James, Foundations of Private Law: Property, Tort, Contract, Unjust Enrichment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), at 31.  Ibid.  Aristoteles, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by W. D. Ross (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 1999), 1129b1  ,   / Aristotelis, Ethica Nicomachea, recognivit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit I. Bywater 1970; repr. in ,   / Aristotel Nikomahova etika, prij. T. 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Ibid., 1131a18-19.  Ibid., 1130b30-33.  V. ibid., 1131a29-1131b15. See the analyisis of Aristotles treatment of geometrical proportion in Keyt, D., Aristotles Theory of Distributive Justice, in Id., and Miller, F. D. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotles Politics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 238-78.  Aristoteles, Nicomachean Ethics, note 35, 1131a24-28.  Ibid., 1133a7.  Ibid., 1132b20.  Commentary according to W. D. Ross and H. Rackham in Aristotel, Nikomahova etika, prij. Ladan (Zagreb: Fakultet politi kih znanosti, 1982), at 98, note 3.  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, note 35, 1133a8-20.  Ibid., 1131a4-6.  This is the interpretation suggested by Hamburger, Max, Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotles Legal Theory (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1951), at 43, however comp. at 48-49.  Chapter 1 of Mehren, A. v., A General View of Contracts, in Id. (ch. ed.), Volume VII. Contracts in General, in R. David (gen. ed.), International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Tuebingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1982).  Friedman, M. D., Natural Rights Libertarianism and Fraud, Natural Rights Libertarian (26 March 2011); http://naturalrightslibertarian.com/2011/03/natural-rights-libertarianism-and-fraud/  A more elegant but unusual - label would be staurative justice, derived from the Latin verb staurare;  HYPERLINK "http://www.dicolatin.com/EN/LAK/0/STAURARE/index.htm" http://www.dicolatin.com/EN/LAK/0/STAURARE/index.htm.  Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, note 35, 1132b22-24.  V. Berman, Harold D., Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 165-98.  Perry, R., The Third Form of Justice: Book Review of Izhak Englard, Corrective Justice and Distributive Justice: From Aristotle to Modern Times (Oxford University Press, 2009), 256 pp., Canadian Journal of Jurisprudence, vol. 23 (2010), 233-47.  Aristotles Constitution of Athens and Related Texts, trans. (New York: Hafner, 1950), sect. 59, 135-37.  Mogens, Herman H., The Athenian Democracy in the age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles, and Ideology (Norman OK: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), at 205-11.  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, note 35, 1137b20-24.  Publicum jus est quod ad statum rei Romani spectat, privatum quod ad singulorum utilitatem. Publicum jus in sacris, in sacerdotibus, in magistratis consistit, privatum jus tripartitum est: collectum etenim est ex naturalibus preceptis aut gentium aut civilibus. Digesta 1,1,1,2. Ius gentium est, quo gentes humanae utuntur quod a naturali recedere facile intellegere licet, quia illud omnibus animalibus, hoc solis hominibus inter se commune sit. Digesta 1,1,1,4.  V. Peri, Berislav, Problem autonomije- heteronomije u pravu <Problem of autonomy and heteronomy in law> (Pravni fakultet Sveu iliata u Zagrebu: dr. diss., 1955). Bloch, Ernst, Naturrecht und menschliche Wuerde (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch, 1972), at 242.  Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, note 18, par. 16, at 220-21.  Ripert, Georges, Le Declin du droit: Etudes sur la legislation contemporaine (Paris: Librairie generale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1949), at 39.  Aristotle, The Politics and Economics of Aristotle, trans. by Walford, E.E., and Gillies, J. (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1908).  V. Reisman, Law, note 21.  The title of the section is borrowed from Cotterrell, R.,Law as Constitutive, International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, vol. 12 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001), 8497-500, which develops arguments similar to the points made in this section.  Padjen, I.,Pravne pretpostavke modernih drutvenih znanosti, Nae teme, 32:7-8 (1988), 1875-1890, summary Legal Presuppositions of Modern Social Sciences , 2070.  Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia recognized (Odluka i Rjeaenje Ustavnog suda Republike Hrvatske broj: U-I-884/1997, U-I-920/1997, U-I- 929/1997, U-I-956/1997, U-I-453/1998, U-I-149/1999. od 3. velja e 2000., obrazlo~enje II.3.4.) that there exist in the Croatian legal order, in accord with the freedom guaranteed by Article 43, Section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, associations that do not meet requirements of a law, such as the requirement of the Law on Associations that an association register with public administration, and, for that reason do not have juridical personality, but nonetheless have the capacity to acquire certain rights and duties.  Zakon o udrugama , Narodne novine: Slu~beni list Republike Hrvatske <Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia>, 74/14.  LoA, Article 1, regulates associations with juridical personality (hereinafter also: registered associations) other than political parties, religious communities, trade unions and associations of employers, providing for that regulations on partnership apply apropriately to associations without juridical personality (hereinafter also: non-registered associations).  Zakon o obveznim odnosima , Narodne novine: Slu~beni list Republike Hrvatske <Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia>, 35/05, 41/08, 125/11 etc.  The objective of the LoA, as stated by LoA Article 2, is  to secure effective (u inkovito) activity of the associations with juridical personality and to create preconditions for efficacious (djelotvorno) financing of the programs and projects of interest to common good conducted by associations in the Republic of Croatia (the Croatian terms u inkovito and djelotvorno in Article 2 of LoA make as little sense as the translations effective and efficacious).  LoA, Article 4 entitled The Concept of Association, defines the association with juridical personality, that is, regiestered association, as any form of free and voluntary association of several natural or juridical persons who, to protect their own advantages or to advocate the protection of human rights and freedoms, protection of the environment and nature and sustainable development, and humanitarian, social, cultural, educational, scientific, sport, health, technological, informational, trade/professional or other convictions and goals that are not contrary to the Constitution and Law, without the intent of gaining profit or other economically advantages that can be assessed, and comply with rules regulating orgranization and activity of that form of association.  ?Tip˅І:`mE !WŽϏd7$8$H$gdKd7$8$H$gd_ dgd_'gd_FTUV[ijks(Kpq˅̅:І҆ :<>H`bԇ lmnȈ܈#DEFQX©hkGFCJaJh\yhkGFCJaJ!jh\yhkGF0J)CJUaJhH?hkGF;hH?hkGFmHsHhH?hkGF6mHsHhH?hkGFmHsHhH?hkGF6jhH?hkGF0J)U hH?hkGF9dlno !"#$9˼~sg\g\TIhH?h@mHsHhkGFmHsHhH?hkGFmHsHhH?hkGF6mHsHhH?hkGFmHsHjhH?hkGF0JUhH?hkGF0JhkGFjhkGFUhH?hkGF6 hH?hkGFjhH?hkGF0J)Uh\yhkGFCJaJmHsH(h\yhkGFCJPJaJmHnHsHtHhkGFCJaJh\yhkGFCJaJh\yhkGF6CJaJ9yڋDmp,ÍύɮɎrncrrɮhH?hw~mHsHhkGFjhH?hkGF0J)Uh\yhkGFCJaJmHsHhKhkGF6CJaJ'h\yhkGF6CJaJmHnHsHtH$h\yhkGFCJaJmHnHsHtHhkGFCJaJh\yhkGFCJaJ!jh\yhkGF0J)CJUaJhH?hkGFmHsH hH?hkGFhH?hkGF6! 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The treatise commented an earlier law on associations, whose principles are retained by LoA.  Zakon o financijskom poslovanju i ra unovodstvu neprofitnihorganizacija <The Law on financial affairs and accounting of not-for-profit organizations>, Narodne novine: Slu~beni list Republike Hrvatske <Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia>, 121/14, imposes the following duties on a not-for-profit organization, including an association with juridical personality: Article 2, Section 1,  Provisions of this Law apply to domestic and foreign associations&  ; Article 9, section 1,  Not-for-profit organization keeps its financial records according to the principle of double accounting... ; Article 9, section 2,  Exceptionally, the statutory representative of a not-for-profit ogranization can adopt the Decision to keep simple accounting and apply the principle of monetary accounting if: - the value of assets of the not-for-profit organization at the end of three years consecutively is lower than 230.000,oo kuna&  (1 euro = ca 7,5 kunas); Article 9, section 5 :   Not-for-profit organization is required in the first three years since it was founded to keep double accounting ; Article 12, section 1,  Financial records of double accounting are kept by a not-for-profit organization are as follows: diary, principal book, additional books ; etc.. Sanctions against a not-for-profit organization, including an association with juridical personality, are as follows: Article 45, section 1,  A not-for-profit organization that does not keep double accounting will be fined for the administrative offence in the amount from 5.000,oo to 200.000,oo kunas (1 euro = ca 7,5 kunas ); etc.  Hallis, Frederick, Corporate Personality: A Study in Jurisprudence (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), 3-28.  V. Enneccerus, Ludwig, Allgemeiner Teil des buegerlichen Rechts, 14. Aufl. v. Nipperdey, Hans Carl (Tuebingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1952), at 408-11.  Emberland, Marius, Human Rights of Companies: Exploring the Structure of ECHR Protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); comp. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S.(2010)  Clark, A.,  Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Quits Swiss System to Make UK its New Legal Home , Guardian: Main section (Tuesday 21 September 2010), 26; http:// HYPERLINK "http://www.guardian.co.uk" guardian.co.uk (Monday 20 September 2010 19.27 BST). DOVLE  Vanderlinden, Jacques, Comparer les droits (Diegem: Kluwer, 1995), ch. 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