Naslov
Identification and self-knowledge

Autori
Malatesti, Luca ; Čeč, Filip

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Sažeci sa skupova, neobjavljeni rad, znanstveni

Skup
Conference: Contemporary Philosophical Issues: Society, Agency and Knowledge

Mjesto i datum
Rijeka, Hrvatska, 24.05.2016. - 25.05.2016

Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje

Vrsta recenzije
Domaća recenzija

Ključne riječi
moral responsibilitiy ; identification ; self-knowledge

Sažetak
Recently some philosophers have maintained that to approach the issue of the moral responsibility of the psychopathic offenders we should focus on their capacity for mental time travel (Kennett & Matthews 2009 ; Levy 2014 ; see also, on the successful psychopaths, Varga 2015). Mental time travel is: ”the ability to project oneself into the future or the past: to recall, in a distinctively first-person manner, past episodes and to simulate possible future scenarios in which one is personally engaged.” (Suddendorf & Corballis 2008). Besides the details of their respective approaches, these authors have used an argument of this general form: Moral responsibility requires the capacity for mental time travel. Psychopaths lack or are impaired in their capacity for mental time travel. Thus, Psychopaths are not (or less) morally responsible for their crimes. We argue that both premises of the previous argument might be supported by focusing on certain minimal capacities for self- knowledge that are relevant for certain forms of mental time travel.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Filozofija

POVEZANOST RADA