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A deontic blind spot: An argument for a specialized moral reasoning schema


Sudić, Mislav; Valerjev, Pavle
A deontic blind spot: An argument for a specialized moral reasoning schema // XXV naučni skup - Empirijska istraživanja u psihologiji
Beograd: Institut za psihologiju, Laboratorija za eksperimentalnu psihologiju, Filozofski fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu, 2019. str. 30-31 (predavanje, međunarodna recenzija, sažetak, znanstveni)


Naslov
A deontic blind spot: An argument for a specialized moral reasoning schema

Autori
Sudić, Mislav ; Valerjev, Pavle

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Sažeci sa skupova, sažetak, znanstveni

Izvornik
XXV naučni skup - Empirijska istraživanja u psihologiji / - Beograd : Institut za psihologiju, Laboratorija za eksperimentalnu psihologiju, Filozofski fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu, 2019, 30-31

ISBN
978-86-6427-091-5

Skup
XXV naučni skup Empirijska istraživanja u psihologiji

Mjesto i datum
Beograd, Srbija, 29-31.03.2019

Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje

Vrsta recenzije
Međunarodna recenzija

Ključne riječi
Moral reasoning, conventions, deontic logic, deontic blind spot

Sažetak
Deontic reasoning is a type of logical reasoning that uses rule-type operators (obligations and permissions). It can also be used as a normative for determining and comparing rule-reasoning accuracy across content-types, such as morality and conventions, which was the goal of this study. We designed a 3x2x2 deontic reasoning task that tracked participants' performance (response time and accuracy) across three contents (moral, conventional, abstract), two rule-types (obligation, permission), and two induced dilemma-types (punishment dilemma, reward dilemma). Participants (N=78) were psychology undergraduates and graduates. They solved a total of 96 deontic dilemmas. We correctly hypothesized superior performance for moral over KOGNITIVNA PSIHOLOGIJA31conventional, and conventional over abstract contents (RT: F(2, 132) = 11.33, p < .01 ; accuracy: F(2, 134) = 19.71, p < , 01) ; as well as better performance for punishment over reward dilemmas (RT: F(1, 66) = 12.26, p < .01 ; accuracy: F(1, 67) = 13.47, p < .01). However, contrary to our expectations, not only was the performance for obligations superior, it yielded the largest effect size (RT: F(1, 66) = 97.35, p < .01, ηp2 = .596 ; accuracy: F(1, 67) = 121.47, p < .01, ηp2 = .645). Looking into main effect interactions, we discovered an interesting phenomenon. Participants, when reasoning conventionally and abstractly, often made a logical error in rules that had the form of "It's permissible to perform [an undesirable action]". If understood correctly, this permission-type rule was supposed to induce a reward dilemma. However, it seems participants perceived this situation as a punishment dilemma, dropping their accuracy by 21-25%. We dubbed this bias "the deontic blind spot". Even more interestingly, it seems this effect was not present during moral reasoning. A specialized moral reasoning schema, implied by Turiel's Domain theory, may account for the compensatory effect of moral content for that bias. The possible existence of a moral reasoning schema is further explained by the fact that moral reasoning performance does not seem to depend on either rule-type, or the induced dilemma, unlike abstract and conventional deontic reasoning.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Psihologija



POVEZANOST RADA


Ustanove
Sveučilište u Zadru

Autor s matičnim brojem:
Pavle Valerjev, (228360)