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"Argument sličnosti" i prijepori oko mimesisa (CROSBI ID 254679)

Prilog u časopisu | izvorni znanstveni rad | domaća recenzija

Delija, Nives "Argument sličnosti" i prijepori oko mimesisa // Prolegomena, 3 (2004), 1; 3-14

Podaci o odgovornosti

Delija, Nives

hrvatski

"Argument sličnosti" i prijepori oko mimesisa

It is possible to show that mimetic principle is not the reason why Plato condemns art, and that the notion of artistic mimesis in fact steems from the metaphysical notion of mimesis as approximation of gradual resemblance to the paradigm. In this case artistic mimesis achieves higher ontological authenticity and imitate the ideal by means of the sensory. Parmenides'"resemblance argument" may constitute a serious obstacle for the acceptance of, on the one hand, the idea of the relation of resemblance (homoiotes) between Forms and particulars, that is between the paradigm and its image, and on the other hand it may question the idea of approximation in which mimetic principle has metaphysical foundation. However, when Form is seen as a synthetic unity of many things (hen epi pollon), it then represents the right standpoint for the explanation of the phenomena, and it becomes questionable when it is placed on the same level with its exemplars. If the relation of resemblance between the paradigm and its image is determined by the "dynamic", and not by "symmetric resemblance" in which both parts are on the same level of ontological authenticity, then the view of philosophical mimesis as approximation on which relies artistic mimetic concept is legitimate.

Platon, umjetnost, mimesis, sličnost, aproksimacija, Parmenid

nije evidentirano

engleski

"Recemblance Argument" and Controversies over Mimesis

nije evidentirano

Plato, art, mimesis, resemblance, approximation, Parmenides

nije evidentirano

Podaci o izdanju

3 (1)

2004.

3-14

objavljeno

1333-4395

1846-0593

Povezanost rada

Filozofija

Poveznice