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The Eurogroup: reflections on legitimacy and accountability

The Euro area sovereign debt crisis provoked transformative effects within the governance of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), introducing new modes of policy-making as well as new stakeholders within the governance structure, among which the Eurogroup. Although an “informal body” that gathers high-level, national representatives in deliberations related to wider economic matters within the Euro area, the Eurogroup quickly established itself as a key influencer of the policy agenda of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin). The Eurogroup's prominent role within EMU policy- making has attracted scholarly attention, with some noting that the body's role in decision- making is “under-theorized” (Craig 2017, p. 234), which in turn raises important concerns in regards of the Eurogroup's accountability and legitimacy. Against this background, the paper examines the Eurogroup's legitimacy and (political) accountability, by outlining (or mapping) theoretical and legal basis thereof, especially in the perspective of EMU's growing democratic deficit. In so doing the paper contributes to the broader literature on the legitimacy and democracy in the EU and the Euro area more concretely (Schmidt, 2013 ; Olsen 2007 ; Chopin 2013 ; Rose 2013 ; Scharpf 2015 ; Chopin 2016) furthering in particular the scholarship on legitimacy and accountability of EMU governance (Verdun 1999 ; Bovens, Curtin and 't Hart 2010 ; Alcidi, Giovannini and Piedrafita 2014 ; Olsen 2017 ) from the perspectives of political philosophy and political economy. Given the Eurogroup's prominent profile the paper's findings are relevant both for the academic as well as the policymaking community.

Euro area crisis, Eurogroup, legitimacy, accountability

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