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Statistical Model Checking of Distance Fraud Attacks on the Hancke-Kuhn Family of Protocols


Alturki, M.A.; Kanovich, Max; Ban Kirigin, Tajana; Nigam, Vivek; Scedrov, Andre; Talcott, Carolyn
Statistical Model Checking of Distance Fraud Attacks on the Hancke-Kuhn Family of Protocols // Proceedings of the 2018 Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy, CPS-SPC '18
New York, NY, USA: ACM Digital Library, 2018. str. 60-71 (predavanje, međunarodna recenzija, cjeloviti rad (in extenso), znanstveni)


Naslov
Statistical Model Checking of Distance Fraud Attacks on the Hancke-Kuhn Family of Protocols

Autori
Alturki, M.A. ; Kanovich, Max ; Ban Kirigin, Tajana ; Nigam, Vivek ; Scedrov, Andre ; Talcott, Carolyn

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Radovi u zbornicima skupova, cjeloviti rad (in extenso), znanstveni

Izvornik
Proceedings of the 2018 Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy, CPS-SPC '18 / - New York, NY, USA : ACM Digital Library, 2018, 60-71

ISBN
978-1-4503-5992-4

Skup
ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security & Privacy (CPS-SPC)

Mjesto i datum
Toronto, Kanada, 19.10.2018

Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje

Vrsta recenzije
Međunarodna recenzija

Ključne riječi
Distance-bounding protocols, Distance fraud, Probabilistic rewriting, Statistical model checking, Maude

Sažetak
Distance-bounding (DB) protocols protect against relay attacks on proximity-based access control systems. In a DB protocol, the verifier computes an upper bound on the distance to the prover by measuring the time-of-flight of exchanged messages. DB protocols are, however, vulnerable to distance fraud, in which a dishonest prover is able to manipulate the distance bound computed by an honest verifier. Despite their conceptual simplicity, devising a formal characterization of DB protocols and distance fraud attacks that is amenable to automated formal analysis is non-trivial, primarily because of their real-time and probabilistic nature. In this work, we introduce a generic, computational model, based on Rewriting Logic, for formally analyzing various forms of distance fraud, including recently identified timing attacks, on the Hancke- Kuhn family of DB protocols through statistical model checking. While providing an insightful formal characterization on its own, the model enables a practical formal analysis method that can help system designers bridge the gap between conceptual descriptions and low-level designs. In addition to accurately confirming known results, we use the model to define new attack strategies and quantitatively evaluate their effectiveness under realistic assumptions that would otherwise be difficult to reason about manually.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Matematika, Računarstvo



POVEZANOST RADA


Projekt / tema
HRZZ-UIP-05-2017-9219

Ustanove
Sveučilište u Rijeci - Odjel za matematiku

Autor s matičnim brojem:
Tajana Ban-Kirigin, (229313)