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Human Nature and Human Freedom in Spinoza

In Spinoza, reality is divided into that which is in another and depends on another for its essence and existence and that which is in itself, and depends only on itself. The substantia infinita is only thing that can be called „free“ in a proper sense (Ethics 1D7, 1P17 and C2), ; whereas everything else, insofar as it is caused by another, is and exists in another, conceived through another – is determined or compelled by another to exist and act in a particular way – and not by its nature alone. Human freedom participates in the paradoxical unity of necessity and freedom in the substantia infinita. The model for this view of absolute and human freedom is Plotinus' neo-Platonic interpretation of Plato's Idea of the Good as the One beyond being and thought, as exemplified in particular in Ennead VI, 8: On Free Will and the Will of the One. Human beings, like other particular things („finite modes“), are part of nature and follow the order of nature according to which all things ensue, proceeding from the one infinite substance with the same necessity with which „from the nature of the triangle“ follows „that its three angles are equal two right angles“ (cf. Ethics 1D1, 2, 6 ; 1P17S). From Spinoza’s definition of freedom it follows, in Propositions 28 and 29 of Part 1, that 1) all things are determined „to exist and produce an effect“ by the substantia infinita or God's „infinite nature“, so that 2) „In nature there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way.“ It follows that in the human mind „there is no absolute, or free, will, “ but rather „the Mind is determined to will this or that by a cause which is also determined by another, and this again by another, and so to infinity“ (2P48). We only think ourselves free because we are conscious of our actions and ignorant of the causes by which we are determined. In other words, the ordinary idea of freedom consists in mere ignorance of the causes of our actions. Thus, when people say that human actions depend on the will, „these are only words for which they have no idea“, since „all are ignorant of what the will is, and how it moves the body“ (2P35S). If intellect may be attributed to God, albeit in a sense which differs toto coelo from the sense in which the word is used of our intellect, namely not as „by nature either posterior to [...] or simultaneous with the things understood“, but as „prior in causality to all things“, then „God's intellect“ may be said to be „the only cause of things [...] both of their essence and of their existence“. (1P17S). Our mind „is determined to will this or that“ by a concatenation of causes which stretches to infinity, and thus cannot be properly understood as „a free cause of its own actions“ (2P48). It is only imagination which causes us to regard things as contingent, whereas „[I]t is in the nature of reason to regard things as necessary, and not contingent“. It follows that in the human mind „there is no absolute, or free, will, “ but rather „the Mind is determined to will this or that by a cause which is also determined by another, and this again by another, and so to infinity“ (2P48). We only think ourselves free because we are conscious of our actions and ignorant of the causes by which we are determined. In other words, the ordinary idea of freedom consists in mere ignorance of the causes of our actions. Reason, by nature, views things sub specie aeternitatis, as they follow from the „very necessity of God's eternal nature“ (2P48 and C2). The path that leads to freedom, perfection of human nature, blessedness is adequate knowledge of the causes by which things follow from God's nature, in particular the causes of the emotions, by which knowledge they are transformed from passive to active emotions.

Spinoza, nature, natura naturans, human nature, natura naturata, necessity, freedom, emotions, reason, sensible, supersensible, noumena, phenomena

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