engleski

The concept of possibility in ontological proofs

We focus on the concept of possibility in the ontological proofs by Leibniz (Quod ens perfectissimum existit, 1676) and Gödel (1970, and earliar drafts), with respect to Kant's critique of ontological proofs (Critique of pure reason, B 599--630). We show that Kant's critique can be viewed as an intermediary point for Gödel's improvement of the Leibnizian proof, especially with respect to the concept of possibility. In particular, we show that on the ground of Kant's exposition of the concept of the "transcendental ideal of pure reason" (B 599--608) essential aspects of a formal proof of the possibility of ens realissimum can be reconstructed. In so doing, parts of Kantian ("regulative") model theory are being transformed into an intensional higher-order logic, which can be accompanied with a sort of religious semantics. The reconstructed possibility proof strongly resembles Gödel's first part of his proof. Differences between Kant's and Gödel's concepts of possibilities will be analyzed, especially in connection with the concepts of analyticity, reality and existence.

possibility, ontological proof, Leibniz, Kant, real property

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