engleski

Wittgenstein on the self – We, robots

In the text the author develops some previously researched ideas on Wittgenstein on consciousness in his later philosophy (see Krkač, Lukin 2006a, 2006b, 2012), namely in PI, and some new analysis of solipsism in his early philosophy, namely in TLP. The starting point is the identity of a quite developed kind of a robot capable of learning, i.e. the Terminator model T-101. In previous paper (Krkač, Lukin 2012) the author developed specific criticism on standpoint of Antti Kuusela’s paper “Wittgenstein and what’s inside the Terminator’s head” (Kuusela 2009:266-79). In the present one, and based on criticism of Kuusela, further implications will be explicated concerning the nature of the self, particularly of solipsism in TLP and of self in PI. In a nutshell, what is analyzed here is Wittgenstein’s form of life condition which differs, not only human self from animal or artificial selves, but which differs particular human selves one from another as well. Nevertheless, acquisition of a particular form of life and living a life which by its practices, routines, and culture essentially manifests the human self is problematic criterion of self for a series of reasons some of which are the following: the criterion claims perhaps only necessary condition of the self, but not the sufficient one, the criterion is quite complex, forms of life are in constant change.

BB, living human beings, self, self-consciousness, self-identity, self-knowledge, Terminator T- 101, TLP, PI, Wittgenstein

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