engleski

Examining Agency Governance In The EU Financial Sector – A Case-Study Of ESMA

Ever since the outset of the crisis agencies have emerged as key actors of EU financial sector governance. As an organizational form that can be insulated from national political pressures, and committed to the Union interest, agencies proliferated in the financial sector ushering the agencification trend in finance. In this sense, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) – as part of the European Supervisory Authorities, practically embodies this trend. ESMA presents a radical shift in financial markets’ governance due to the nature of its soft law regulations and the direct impact it exerts on addressees’ behavior in emergency circumstances. But ESMA’s success in optimizing financial sector governance largely depends on its legitimacy, which is centered on independence. At the same time independence demands wider participation and inclusiveness of the decision-making process. This is not easy to achieve in a complex system with multiple stakeholders as is the governance of EU financial sector (e.g. EU institutions, national actors, private sector). This paper examines ESMA’s interinstitutional relations and independence in light of publicly voiced criticism. We find that ESMA’s main executive bodies are still susceptible to influences by Member States as well as EU institutions (i.e. Commission), which undermines its operational independence.

agency governance, ESMA, independence

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