engleski

Some reflections on the governance and accountability of the Single Resolution Board

Although the SRB departs from the model of other EU agencies in the financial sector (e.g. ESAs) this entity displays singular features, with enhanced agency powers and greater centralization of governance at the EU level. In this sense, the Board’s establishment adds momentum to the on going agencification process in the EMU. Within a short period of time agencies have progressed from auxiliary, technocratic expertise and quasi rule making to more independent decision-making. The increase in agencies’ powers further complicates the governance process, as the interplay between various actors and levels of EMU governance has to be re-adjusted to the interpretative limits of the Meroni doctrine. Building on these facts this paper firstly examines the interplay between the Board and other stakeholders in the decision-making process (the Commission and Council), particularly in respect of the limitations set by the Meroni doctrine. Secondly, the paper ascertains whether the established accountability arrangements appropriately frame the Board’s policy powers and thus legitimize agency governance within EMU.

SRB ; agency governance ; resolution

nije evidentirano