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Intentionalism as a Theory of Self-Deception

Cerovac, Ivan
Intentionalism as a Theory of Self-Deception // Balkan Journal of Philosophy, 7 (2015), 2; 145-150 doi:10.5840/bjp20157218 (međunarodna recenzija, pregledni rad, znanstveni)

Intentionalism as a Theory of Self-Deception

Cerovac, Ivan

Balkan Journal of Philosophy (1313-888X) 7 (2015), 2; 145-150

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Radovi u časopisima, pregledni rad, znanstveni

Ključne riječi
Self-deception; Intentionalism; Anti-Intentionalism; Mind partitioning; Attentional strategy

Is self-deception something that just happens to us, or is it an intentional action of an agent? This paper discusses intentionalism, a theory claiming that self-deception is intentional behavior that aims to produce a belief that the agent does not share. The agent is motivated by his belief that p (e.g. he is bald) and his desire that not-p (e.g. not to be bald), and if self-deceiving is successful, the agent will end up believing not-p. Opponents of intentionalism raise two different objections: it seems that self- deceiver should then simultaneously hold two incompatible beliefs (namely, that p and not-p), as well as simultaneously intend the deception and be unaware of it. This paper reviews possible answers to anti-intentionalist objections (temporal partitioning, psychological partitioning, and the attentional strategy account) and offers guidelines to strengthen intentionalist claims.

Izvorni jezik

Znanstvena područja


Filozofski fakultet, Rijeka

Autor s matičnim brojem:
Ivan Cerovac, (354865)

Časopis indeksira:

  • Web of Science Core Collection (WoSCC)
    • Emerging Sources Citation Index (ESCI)

Uključenost u ostale bibliografske baze podataka:

  • Central and East European Online Library - CEEOL
  • Philosopher's Index
  • EBSCO Discover
  • Emerging Sources Citation Index of Thomson Reuters, Google Scholar
  • Philosophy Research Index
  • PhilPapers