engleski

MORAL RATIONALISM UNDER EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT

In this thesis I explore the impact and arguments that were based on recent discoveries in empirical moral psychology on the explicit and implicit ideas of philosophical moral rationalism. I follow the philosophical literature in differentiating conceptual, psychological and justificatory moral rationalism and spell out the relevant differences between these claims. Furthermore, because of the insufficient specification, in the philosophical literature, of the justificatory rationalist claim, I give my own characterization of it based on epistemological and ontological analogy that moral rationalist make with the rationality of mathematics. Finally, I give an overview of the relevant empirical studies that bear significance on the ideas of moral rationalism and base my arguments on these empirical findings. I conclude that empirical findings undermine most of the tenets of moral rationalism.

Psychological theories of moral judgments ; conceptual moral rationalism ; justificatory rationalism ; psychological rationalism

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