engleski

Responsibilism and the identity of cognitive character

Various versions of contemporary responsibilist virtue epistemology (by L. Code, J. Montmarquet, L. Zagzebski and others) assume that knowledge derives from stable dispositions to produce true beliefs. According to responsibilists, these dispositions are like intellectual virtues, and constitute that what is usually labeled as virtuous “cognitive character” or virtuous “epistemic character”. In this paper responsibilist approach is confronted with skepticism concerning the existence of moral character as a consistent and robust collection of moral virtues (e.g. by J. Doris and G. Harman). If skepticism about moral character is right, then responsibilist virtue epistemology, analyzing and explaining knowledge by means of the analogous idea of cognitive or epistemic character, faces analogous difficulties. Moreover, some examples are provided to show that having a responsibly or conscientiously produced true belief, or a true belief produced by a virtuously motivated cognitive agent, is neither necessary nor sufficient condition for knowledge.

cognitive character; identity; reliabilism; responsibilism

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