engleski

Identity statements and metalinguistic content

Departing from standard Fregean/descriptivist and direct reference treatments of identity statements, and related informativeness and substitution failure puzzles, a number of authors argued that (or wrote as if) identity statements have metalinguistic content and truth conditions. To say that Cicero is Tully, according to them, amounts to saying something as: names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ refer to the same thing ; and it is true that Cicero is Tully iff names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ refer to the same thing. In my talk I consider some arguments against the thesis that identity statements have metalinguistic content if such content is to be taken as their propositional or semantic content. I start with Frege who was probably the first who criticized the metalinguistic view of identity statements. I argue that his arguments against the view are not sufficient to undermine it, and I consider an addition argument against the view. I also outline possible solutions one might adopt in order to save the view.

Identity statements; metalinguistic content

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