

20. Ley Orgánica 11/1995, de 27 de noviembre, de abolición de la pena de muerte en tiempo de Guerra // BOE número 284 de 28/11/1995, páginas 34269 a 34270.
21. Lleixa J. Autonomia del ejercito y organos superiores de la defense nacional en la transicion // Revista Espanola de Investigaciones Sociologicas. 1986. - № 36. – P. 101-117.
22. Marquez Mella M. Los grupos de precion en la transicion politica // Tezanos J. F., Cotarelo R., Blas A. de. La transicion democratica espanola. – Madrid : Editorial Sistema, 1993. – P. 164-171.
23. Martín Jorge Ortega . La transformación de los ejércitos españoles (1975 - 2008). Madrid : Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, Instituto Universitario Gutiérrez Mellado, 2008. – 388 p.
24. Navarro Esteban J. 25 anos sin Constitucion. - Madrid: Foca investigacion, 2003. – 171 p.
25. Powell Ch. Espana en democracia. 1975 – 2000. – Barcelona: Plaza Janez, 2001. – 688 p.
26. Preston P. The triumph of democracy in Spain. – L., N.Y., Methuen, 1986. – 274 p.
27. Real Decreto 2945/1983, de 9 de noviembre, por el que se aprueban las Reales Ordenanzas del Ejercito de Tierra // BOE número 285 de 29/11/1983, páginas 32276 a 32292.
28. Real Decreto 611/1986, de 21 de marzo, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento de la Ley del Servicio Militar // BOE número 79 de 2/4/1986, páginas 11574 a 11602.
29. Real Decreto 494/1984, de 22 de febrero, por el que se aprueban las Reales Ordenanzas del Ejército del Aire // BOE número 61 de 12/3/1984, páginas 6869 a 6886.
30. Real Decreto 1/1987, de 1 de enero, por el que se determina la Estructura Orgánica Básica del Ministerio de Defensa // BOE número 2 de 2/1/1987, páginas 75 a 80.
31. Real Decreto 537/1994, de 25 de marzo, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento del militar de empleo de la categoría de official // BOE número 88 de 13/4/1994, páginas 11127 a 11136.
32. Real Decreto 1024/1984, de 23 de mayo, por el que se aprueban las Reales Ordenanzas de la Armada // BOE número 129 de 30/5/1984, páginas 15232 a 15252.
33. Salas Lopez F. de, Laguna Sanquirico F. Las reales ordenanzas en el momento actual de la sociedad Espanola // Revista Espanola de Investigaciones Sociologicas. 1986. - № 36. – P. 118- 126.
34. Spain in the 1980s: The Democratic transicion a new international role/ Ed. By Clark R.P., Haltzel M.H.-Cambridge (Mass.): Ballinger. 1987. - XIII, 206 p.
35. Villa Fernando Puell de la. Historia del ejército en España. Editorial: Alianza Año: 2005. – 320 p.

Годлевская В. Ю. Военная реформа и ее роль в утверждении демократического режима в Испании (1982-1996 гг.)

В статье исследуется реформирование военной сферы в условиях консолидации демократического режима в Испании. В отмеченный период окончательно был решен “военный вопрос”. Армия перестала выступать в роли арбитра внутривнутриполитической жизни. Испанская социалистическая рабочая партия, которая пришла к власти в 1982 г., поставила Вооруженные силы под гражданский контроль.

Ключевые слова: консолидация демократии, политическая система, вооруженные силы, политика обороны, военная служба, реформа, модернизация.

Godlews'ka V. Yu. Military reform and its role in strengthening of democratic regime in Spain (1982-1996)
Reformation of military sphere in the conditions of consolidation of the democratic mode in Spain is investigated in the article. A "military question" was finally decided in a noted period. An army left off to play role of arbiter of home policy life. Spanish socialistic working party which came to power in 1982 put military powers under civil control.

Keywords: consolidation of democracy, political system, military powers, policy of defensive, military service, reform, modernization.

УДК 94:329.13(8)

L. Kos-Stanišić

NEW LEFT IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD – THE CASE OF LATIN AMERICA

The Author presents, in her work, the phenomenon of the new Left in Latin America, which is currently in power in the eight out of 18 democratic states in the region. Using the examples of politics of Left oriented presidents, she analyses the politics of moderate and radical Left. As a special case, she elaborates Argentina and the politics of “Kirchnerism” which combines elements from both Lefts.

Keywords: new Left, Latin America, “Kirchnerism”

Introduction

Latin America represents a living laboratory of social and political changes. Another proof of the mentioned theses is the phenomenon of Latin America's turn to the left and coming to power of the “new Left”. This trend began in Venezuela in 1998, when in free and fair elections Hugo Chávez was elected. Soon followed Chile, where in 2000 leftist Ricardo Lagos won the elections as a president candidate of coalition *Concertacion*. Left political options in Latin America were at their peak in 2009, when they were in power in twelve democratic (out of twenty) states in the region, while Cuba and Haiti are not considered as democracies. In summer 2009 leftist Zelaya was overthrown in Honduras, following that in Chile, after ten years of socialist governance, in 2010 the Right returned to power, same as in Guatemala in the beginning of 2012. In the same year in June, the Left president of

Paraguay, Fernando Lugo was overthrown. At the moment (August 2012), the Left is in power in eight states of Latin America – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Venezuela, which points a downward trend. The topic of the work will be a new Left in the Latin America. In the first chapter, I will explain the reasons for the raising of the Left in the Latin America, and I will demonstrate, on the examples of states and their presidents, the politics of the moderate and radical Left. Second chapter will be analysing the politics of the married couple and presidents of the Argentina Néstor Kirchner and Christine Fernández de Kirchner, whose governance combines elements of radical and moderate Left.

Raising of the Left in Latin America

The raising of the Left can be explained by discontent of voters with the quality of democracy they were living in, increase of poverty and inequality, disappointment with democratic institutions (particularly Parties), inability to create adequate mechanisms of participation, representation and responsibility, and domestic and foreign policy effects of globalisation [16]. Two decades of obedient conducting of Washington consensus policy did not produce expected results, this lead to a great discontent in neo-liberalistic politics of Latin American presidents of the right centre. Therefore, Latin America decided, in 21st century, to give chance to Left political options. Additional wind in the back was provided by happenings in Europe and the USA, where movements and groups, which called in question integrity of neoliberal ideas, grew stronger [4]. Although the politics of new Latin American Left differs from old Lefts and the rule of Castro brothers, Salvadore Allende or *sandinists*, the scientists cannot agree on how many new Lefts there are in Latin America today. In the volume “The “New Left” and Democratic Governance in Latin America” four types of Left in governance are distinct: (1) Social-democratic – Chile, Uruguay, Brazil; (2) Left governments that come from established populist Parties – peronists in Argentina; (3) Populist Left whose governance is based on new political movements governed by charismatic leader – Venezuela; (4) Left movements in which there is a bottom-up independent mobilisation of citizens – Bolivia [16]. Rovira Kaltwasser distinct three Lefts, namely governments of Left centre that strive to liberal democracy – Brazil, Uruguay and Chile (2000-2010), populist Left that strives to radical democracy – Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and governments that implement measures which represent combination of liberal and radical democracy – Argentina (Kirchners) and Paraguay (Lugo) [4]. We even can say that some researchers distinct “good” and “bad”, “social democratic” and “populist” and “moderate” and “radical”.

Despite the critics that dichotomy often leads to simplification, for the purpose of the article we will use the division on moderate and radical Left. Moderate Left respects the economic limitations and political opposition and resolves problems by negotiations rather than imposition. As oppose to that, radical Left questions neoliberalism and globalisation and, in order to keep and strengthen the mass of followers, it constantly confronts its “enemies” – political adversaries, entrepreneurs, American government. However, new radicals are far from radicals in the sixties and the seventies of the last century, they don't uphold complete transformation of socio-economic and political order, not even in the case of Venezuela. Radical Left in Latin America is represented by Venezuela which is a role-model for all Chávez think-alike and which offers political and financial assistance to Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. Examples of moderate Left are Chile until 2010, Brazil and Uruguay.

Moderate and radical Left do not represent nearly concept constructions, they also act as allies in international community. The goal of both new Lefts is to reach egalitarianism transformation by deliberative political action, at the same time leaning on State as the main instrument of remaking of economy and society. The question is how to achieve this – by realism or voluntaristic activism? As long as radical Left discards neoliberalism and boundaries of economic globalization, and achieves its goal by political reforms which strengthen participatory values of democracy of majority, moderate Left negotiates reforms with domestic and international factors of established order [8, p. 2-5].

Social justice and promotion of social equality have always been the key goal of the Left, and while moderate Left gradually decreases poverty, radical Left creates social programmes of provision of cheap food, social welfare and numerous free social services. Radical leftist do not practice massive expropriation of domestic entrepreneurs, rather they finance themselves by high price of raw materials on international market and taxes imposed on foreign companies. Land reforms implemented in Venezuela and Bolivia were an exception. As oppose to Venezuela, which is highly urbanized country, and land distribution was more of a symbolic character (although it did provoke a strong disagreement by the opposition), land reform in rural Bolivia was extremely important and controversial, considering that land in eastern lowland provinces, in which opposition is in power, was distributed.

Radical Left also wishes to strengthen the participatory aspects of democracy, therefore it often announces elections, referendums and plebiscites, introduces new institutions, the purpose of which is to consult with citizens, recall the officials and write new constitutions. In doing so, the representative character of democracy is transformed by invoking the sovereignty of people, who discard the system of checks and balance, and create new institutional framework concentrating power in the hands of the president who is directly related to the people – direct democracy.

Growth of satisfaction of voters, by functioning of direct democracy is evident, as well as decreases of political pluralism that leads to polarization of society. We will try to answer the question why some Lefts chose moderate and others radical course. The main reason is that left parties, coalitions and governments in Chile (*Partido Socialista*), Brazil (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*) and Uruguay (*Frente Amplio*) are shaped by organizational and institutional boundaries. They are a part of highly institutionalized party system and they cooperate with the opposition. Moderate Left in Latin America was born in the process of de-radicalization of left parties and turn to the

centre, embracing market reforms and collapse of communism in the late 1980's and 1990's. Socialist Party of Chile (founded in 1930) and Worker's Party in Brazil (founded in 1980) arise much later than *Movimiento Quinta Republica* (MVR) and *Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS) which are younger and not organizationally consolidated. Chávez's MVR and Morales's MAS are personal movements arisen from the ruins of party system as forces of opposition to boundaries of neoliberalism and representative democracy; therefore they are in constant conflict with the opposition. They differ by the fact that Chávez's MVR is organized top-down, while MAS represents bottom-up mobilization of peasants and representatives of native nations.

Moderate left emerged in the stable, efficient states with low degree of corruption and diverse economy. On the other hand, radical Left came into power in states with high degree of instability, inefficiency and corruption, at the same time rich in energetic sources of oil and natural gas. They are extremely critical to the politics of their predecessors which they hold responsible for all evils that affected their country. That is why they consider that concentration of powers in their hands is necessary for the implementation of economic and social reforms. They also consider that all three branches of government, state bureaucracy and all governmental institutions should be in the hands of those in power so that opposition would not be able to obstruct their decisions.

One of the important moves of the radical Left is changing of the Constitution in their own favour (Venezuela 1999, Bolivia 2009) and approval of consecutive re-election of the presidents (Bolivia consecutive, Venezuela unlimited), as well as constant announcement of elections and referendums. They are extremely hostile towards the opposition, impose decisions on them, charge them for criminal activities, force into exile and also they are often in conflict with the media [8, p. 3-25].

Although Chávez government accomplished success related to new social programmes, hegemon tendencies of *chavism* and marginalization of opposition led Venezuela in semi-authoritarian state. Chávez Bolivarian revolution introduced radical changes – bigger restrictions and obstacles for the opposition, less transparency of the government and concentration of power within executive government. However, economic policy did not bring anything new, and represented more return to nationalist model of development state interventionism of 1970s rather than socialism of 21 century.

Following Chávez example, Morales government achieved significant socio-economic changes, however it politically polarised the country and created a possibility of serious conflicts. Coming into power, Morales nationalized gas production. State incomes were significantly improved which enabled the expansion of public investments. Conditioned and unconditioned transfer programmes for seniors and school children were expanded. In overcoming neoliberal politics and strengthening role of the state, Morales government leans mostly on newly discovered gas wealth. By doing so, the government returns to past because, again it adapts politics to incomes gained by export of only one product.

Radical economic and political strategy modelled by Chávez was embraced in 2007 by the president of Ecuador Rafael Correa. He concentrated power in his own hands, prosecuted opposition and media, and used social mobilization to intimidate opponents. Correa, same as Chávez and Morales, implemented institutional reforms. First, he assembled Constituent assembly and designed new Constitution, which was confirmed at referendum in 2008 by majority of voters. This Constitution enables constant re-election of the president and entrusts him with significant power while he can dismiss the Congress and limit freedom of media; the autonomy of Central Bank is abolished, and state is provided with stronger control over strategic sectors such as oil, mining, telecommunication and water management. Correa increased state interventions in economy, particularly oil industry, forced foreign companies to sign new contracts, significantly increasing the state income from the oil industry [8, p. 168]. Due to all this, Correa's government had the possibility to increase funds for social programmes.

Radical Left also changed international economic policy of the Ecuador related to foreign debts, and threatened with payment suspension. Politics was very successful, because in fear that threats will be actualized, Ecuador managed to pay-off some of existing credits on significantly lower amounts (40 % of real debt). Correa discarded Free Trade Agreement with USA. In summer 2009, Ecuador become a member of Chávez's ALBA, the organization whose members are all states, more precisely governments of radical Left in Latin America. ALBA (*Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América*) was founded upon Hugo Chavez suggestion in 2004. ALBA is an international organization for cooperation based on the idea of social, political and economy integration of states of Latin America and Caribbean. Members are left oriented states (governments) in the region. By signing the understanding between Venezuela and Cuba, which was supposed to be counterbalance to FTAA in December 2004, Chavez and Castro agreed exchange of medical experts and oil. In 2006, Bolivia with Evo Morales in charge joined ALBA, in 2007 Nicaragua with Daniel Ortega in charge, in 2008 Honduras with Manuel Zelaya in charge (in 2009 retreated from membership) and in 2009 Ecuador with Rafael Correa in charge. Out of small Caribbean states members of ALBA are: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica and St Vincent and Grenadine [5, p. 64-65].

Correa's politics had not only positive but also negative results such as polarization of society, diminished horizontal responsibility, threatened freedom of media and speech. Positive effect was that charismatic leader managed to mobilise poor social classes which were until then excluded from politics. Correa is relatively popular, and citizens are more content with the way democracy functions in Ecuador than they were few years ago.

The administration of Daniel Ortega has come into power also in the beginning of 2007 and embraced the style of radical Left. Although, up to this moment, Ortega did not implement crucial institutional reforms, he centralized power in his hands, and in the end of 2009, Constitutional Court entrusted him with another consecutive mandate. Ortega's social policy is in balance with the politics of radical Left. He abolished school fees, with Cuban

assistance he established the programme for eradication of illiteracy, extended the agricultural cooperation, and with the assistance of Venezuela created the programme for combating the poverty. He expanded political participation of the poor citizens by creating citizens councils that supervise social programmes and distribution of government assistance on local level, but critics of these councils accuse them of insufficient transparency. However, Ortega's economic policy is not radical, it is moderate. Although, the government's rhetoric is anti-capitalistic, Nicaragua is opened to foreign trade and investments. It also has signed free trade agreement with USA and Central American states including Dominican Republic. Ortega even signed an agreement with IMF and accepted their saving conditions. At the same time, he made an economic alliance with Venezuela and the state joined ALBA. Government frequently prosecutes critics and mobilizes their followers. Although, citizens of Nicaragua are more satisfied with functioning of democracy than they were in previous period, the satisfaction and Ortega's popularity are far from the satisfaction in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, as well as the popularity of presidents Chávez, Morales and Correa.

Except moderate governments of left-centre that strive to liberal democracy and populist Left that strives to radical democracy, there is a third kind of Left that implements measures representing combination of liberal and radical democracy. These were Argentina and Paraguay, considering that in June 2012 Paraguay parliament relieved leftist and ex Bishop Fernando Armino Lugo Méndez (2008-2012) from the president duty, in following chapter I will analyse the case of Argentina and politics of *Kirchnerism* (Spanish *kirchnerismo*).

Kirchnerism – between the radical and moderate left

While it was relatively easy to place abovementioned governments in moderate or radical Left, in case of Argentina this is extremely difficult. While some place Argentina with radicals, others with moderate Left, third group considers that politics of married couple Kirchner – Fernández lies in the middle. It is worth mentioning that it is questionable whether they belong to the Left at all, considering that they come from Peronist Party which belongs to *catch-all* populist movement of centre and right centre. Peronism was shaped round the political figure of Juan Domingo Perón (president of Argentina 1946-1955 and 1973-1975) who, in January 1947, founded Peronist Party (*Partido Peronista*) later also known under name *Partido Justicialista* (PJ). Perón's wish was to transform Argentina into a modern and justly country, which would not be governed by capitalism or communism but third development path – *justicialismo*. This doctrine uphold cooperation of social classes, state interventionism, nationalistic politics and non-alignment, by which Argentina would become economically independent, socially fair and politically sovereign state [17, p. 421].

Soon, Peronist Party transformed in typical charismatic Party that identifies itself with its leader, is subordinate to his will, centralised, and has a character of a movement. Peronist Party was just one of the segments of Peronist movement (*Movimiento Peronista*). Other constituents were Women Peronist Party (*Partido Peronista Femenino*) and the Union *Confederacion General del Trabajo*. Later Peronist Youth joined it [12, p. 143].

After the overthrow of Perón in 1955, the Party was prohibited, but in the early 1970's it was legalised again. PJ won elections 1973, only to be prohibited once more after the overthrow of Perón's wife Isabel in 1976. During the period of military governments known as "dirty war" 30.000 Argentineans were killed or "disappeared". After ending of military governance in 1983 and announcement of free elections that Peronists lost, PJ was transformed in moderate Party oriented to patronage. Right oriented circles connected to labour unions and army were marginalized and moderate social-democrats and social-christian segments gain importance. They returned in power in 1989 and stayed there during 1990's. Peronist Carlos Saul Menem (1989-1999) made a most dramatic turn in Argentinean politics of the 20 century. He introduced orthodox economic-stabilization programme and radical economic liberalization, which was contradictor to traditional Peronist politics. State enterprises were privatised, public finances were cut, peso was pegged to a dollar in exchange rate 1:1, debts were restructured and inflation was restrained. The Economy "wonder" also had negative impact: overrated peso stimulated import, unemployment grew (in the beginning of 1980's it was 5 %, in the middle of 1990's – 19 %) middle class was impoverished (in the beginning of 1990's almost half of middle class citizens crossed to the poor class).

On presidential elections in 1999, the candidate of the Alliance Fernando de la Rúa (UCR) won. He did not fulfil any of his pre-election promises, therefore in 2001 the democracy fell into deep crisis due to bed economic situation and the governance ended in the hands of Peronists again. At first De la Rúa was replaced by peronist governor Adolfo Rodríguez Saá who declared suspense of payments of debt to IMF in the amount of 1.3 billion USD and resigned. After few days he was replaced by another peronist senator Eduardo Duhalde (2002-2003) who was in impossible position. The state was in a stage of social revolution and the government could not satisfy the demands of the protestants.

At the elections scheduled for April 2003, publically vaguely familiar governor of the province Santa Cruz – Néstor Kirchner Ostoic won with 22 % of votes, thus beginning new political era of Argentina. Peronists could not reach an agreement about mutual candidate, so in the first round of elections most votes went to candidates of two fractions of Peronist Party. Former president Carlos Menem won 24 % of votes, but the public surveys indicated that Kirchner will win overwhelmingly in the second round and therefore Menem withdraw from the elections. Nestor Carlos Kirchner Ostoic has Swiss and Croatian roots, considering that his mother is a Chilean with Croatian roots Marija Ostojić.

Nestor was a candidate of Peronist Election Coalition – Victory Front (*Frente para la Victoria*) which was then identified with *Kirchnerism*. *Kirchnerism* (*Kirchnerismo*) was a political movement within Peronist Party formed around married couple Kirchner – Néstor (2003-2007) and Cristina (2007 – today). Characteristic of *Kirchnerism* is that it belongs to left wing of the Peronist Party, pleads for protection of human rights (they have particularly good

relations with associations for human rights protection such as: *Madres de Plaza de Mayo* and *Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo*), discards neoliberal politics conducted by Party colleagues Menem and Fernando de la Rúa, and upholds economy development politics (developmentalism), opposes to conclusion of an agreement for creation of Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and promotes Mercosur (Mercosur is a common market of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. Since summer 2012 Venezuela is a full member and Paraguay is suspended) and good relations with Left Latin American governments – Venezuela, Ecuador, Cuba, Bolivia and Brazil.

Soon after taking over the president function, Néstor Kirchner began to alienate from the politics of his predecessors and to attack the symbols of old politics. He changed the composition of the judges of the Supreme Court who were involved in many corruption scandals, and placed at their positions distinguished legal experts. He managed to abolish the Act on Amnesty of Senior Officers, enacted during Alfonsín governance (*Ley de Obediencia Debida* and *Punto Final*), following that a significant number of dirty war criminals was processed and sentenced to prison during his governance.

He successfully dealt with economy issues, firstly by restructuring of debts and secondly by cancelling payments of debts to IMF. Considering that in 2001 Argentina declared suspension of payments of foreign credits in the amount of round 100 billion USD, Kirchner found solution in “replacement of debts”, and in 2005, he offered the replacement of old bonds with new ones, with the value 70 % of nominal value. Three quarters of creditors accepted the offer, while one quarter seeks justice in the courts. Parts of the creditors received verdicts in their favour, but were still unable to force payment on Argentina. Regarding internal financial policy, he made provinces financially more dependent on federal government. He initiated foreign policy and replaced USA ally with close cooperation with members of Mercosur and other Latin America states.

Political commentators accused him for concentrating powers and excessive use of decrees, as well as for friendship with Hugo Chávez and turning to populism. At the end of his mandate, the numbers were showing that the economy grew with the rate of 9 % per year, which lead to improvement of living standards and decrease of unemployment (from 20 % to 9 %) and poverty (from 50 % to 27 %). Actions of the Nestor government were approved by the citizens in high percentages 2003 – 86 %, 2004 – 73 %, 2005 – 71 %, 2006 – 73 %, 2007 – 52 % [7].

Despite the fact that during his entire mandate he had a high per cent of public approval (60-70 %) he did not run at following presidential elections, thus enabling the victory to his wife, Senator Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. Analytics explained this unusual move with the wish to prolong the governance of the family Kirchner longer than allowed by the Constitution. They considered that the family plan is a new Nestor's candidacy at presidential elections in 2011 and two new mandates in the governance.

Cristina, as well as her husband, was a candidate of the coalition *Frente para la Victoria* (FPV) and won 45% of votes, thus becoming first elected female president of Argentina. Her victory was not contributed only by her husband, but also a very strong Peronist Party which had stabile voting body, *grassroots* organizations and activists who mobilised citizens throughout the state by combination of clientelism and appeal. In the inner provinces of Argentina, where Peronist machinery was the strongest, Cristina won even more than 70 % of votes, while in three biggest cities, Buenos Aires, Cordoba and Rosario she won least of votes. Although, PJ is very fragmented Party with two or three election lists of rival fractions at local elections, due to phenomenon of fusion of candidates from different lists, election loses of Party fragmentation were minimal. The reason is the existing of the phenomenon of fusion of candidates from different lists (*listas colectoras*), in which different candidates for mayors or governors are listed under same presidential candidate.

Cristina followed her husband's politics. During 2008, she confronted the Agricultural Manufactures Association because new system has been established for the export of four most important agricultural products and their derivatives – soy, sunflower, corn and wheat. Agricultural manufactures, affected by the new system, went on strike for over four months, which had a significant impact on domestic and foreign trade. She repeated her husband's offer for replacement of old bonds by new ones, and most of the creditors, based on experience, accepted the offer.

Politics, more and more resembling radical Left gained strength after sudden Néstor's death in the end of 2010. Cristina surrounded herself with personally loyal advisers from the Peronist Youth circle *La Campora* that uphold stronger control of state over economy and are under direct control of her son Máxim Kirchner.

In October 2011, Cristina was, once again the presidential candidate of the Victory Front, and won a record 54.11 % of votes, more than the Party's founder. Moreover, she became a person winning the presidential elections with the highest number in the history of Argentina. During the second mandate *La Campora* gained even more influence on making political decisions. Her people take the leadership of state enterprises, counting on their loyalty to the Kirchner family. Last case was in April 2012 when the Parliament issued a decision of nationalisation of 51 % of YPE, biggest Argentinean oil company owned by Spanish Repsol. Nationalisation was warmly welcomed in Argentina, while in EU, whose member Spain is, the decision was met with great disapproval and threatened to freeze the relations with Argentina. The nationalisation was justified by the necessity of state control over key energetic sector, which was than pronounced to be of a “public interest”. Namely, Argentina was one of the few South American states that did not have strong national oil company. The compensation was offered, and amount remains to be seen after the Decision of the court in Argentina. In spring 2012, on thirtieth anniversary of lost Falkland war, the conflict regarding the sovereignty of Falkland Islands has been actualized.

There are more and more indications that Cristina plans to remain in power, and that she will change the Constitution allowing her the third consecutive election. In the case of change of Constitution, Argentina would

come dangerously close to radicals. Her intention can be tainted by citizens' aversion and significant decrease of popularity. Public survey shows that in August 2012 only 30 % of citizens had positive opinion about the president (39.3 % had negative), which represents a significant decrease of popularity within only a year. Namely, in September 2011, 64.1 % of citizens had positive opinion of Cristina and only 18.2 % had negative opinion [1], this leads to a conclusion that citizens disapprove her moves and politics during second mandate.

After demonstration of politics of married couple Kirchner, we can conclude that in the absence of pure ideological identity, it has qualifications of moderate and radical Left. Political moves correspond more to the strategy of moderate Left – respecting citizens and political rights, and to a lesser extent, freedom of media. Both governments knew how to use social mobilization in dealing with the opposition, but did not implement reforms which would enable over-concentrating of power; also the independency of Courts was preserved. However, critics accused them of concentrating the power in their own hands and leaning to corruption. Economic and social policy of Kirchner-Fernandez, was closer to radical than to moderate Left, particularly after Nestor's death. State intervened significantly in economy – by controlling the export prices, as well as prices of meat, milk, gas and electricity for domestic market. The state took over the private pension funds (founded in 1994), re-nationalised companies that were privatised in 1990's and founded new air and oil company in state ownership.

Conclusion

Unsatisfied by the quality of democracy they were living in, disappointed in democratic institutions and consequences of globalisation, Latin Americans turned to left political options again. At the moment, the Left is in power in the eight states of Latin America, which points a downward trend. The presidents of Brazil, Uruguay (and El Salvador) conduct the politics of moderate Left; respecting economic boundaries and political opposition dealing with problems by negotiations. As opposed to that, politics of radical left moves, bringing into question neoliberalism and globalisation, and constant confrontation with "enemies" is conducted by the presidents of Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua. Argentina represents a separate case, considering that Kirchners conduct politics that combines moderate and radical elements. Political moves resemble more the strategy of a moderate Left, while social and economic policies come much closer to the radical Left. After Nestor's death, radical elements were particularly strengthened, and there are indicators that Cristina will probably move to the radicals' side.

Sources and literature

1. Argentina: Imagen de presidenta argentina Fernández vuelve a caer [Electronic resource] // www.infolatam.com – 2012. – 26 agosto. – Mode of access: <http://www.infolatam.com/2012/08/27/imagen-de-presidenta-argentina-fernandez-vuelve-a-caer/>
2. Castaneda J. Latin America 's Turn Left / Jorge Castaneda [Electronic resource] // Foreign Affairs. – 2006. – Vol. 85. – Mode of access: <http://sandovalhernandezj.people.cofc.edu/r21.pdf>
3. Hernandez I. A "New Left" in Latin America? Or the Same Shades of Old Politics? / Israel Hernandez [Electronic resource] // Global Politics. – Mode of access: www.global-politics.co.uk/issue6/hernandez/
4. Kaltwasser R. C. Moving Beyond the Washington Consensus: The Resurgence of the Left in Latin America / Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser // Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft. – 2010. – № 3. – P. 52-62.
5. Kos-Stanišić L. Latinska Amerika i suvremeni svijet / Kos-Stanišić Lidija [Monograph] – Zagreb: FPZG, 2010. – 182 p.
6. Kos-Stanišić L. (2011) Nova radikalna ljevica u Latinskoj Americi / Lidija Kos-Stanišić // Političke analize. – Zagreb. – 2011. – Vol.6. – P. 3-7.
7. Latinobarometro 2011 Report [Electronic resource] – Mode of access: <http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/LATContenidos.jsp>
8. Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings / Ed. by Kurt Weyland, Raúl L. Madrid, Wendy Hunter. – Cambridge University Press, 2010. – 232 p.
9. Levitsky S. Argentina From Crisis to Consolidation (and Back) / Steven Levitsky // Jorge I. Dominguez, Michael Shifter, eds. Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America. – Baltimor & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. – P. 244-268.
10. Levitsky S. Argentina Democratic Survival amidst Economic Failure / Levitsky Steven // Hagopian F., Mainwaring S., eds. Third wave of democratization in Latin America. – Cambridge University Press, 2005. – P. 63-89.
11. Levitsky S., Murillo M. V. From Kirchner to Kirchner / Levitsky Steven, Murillo Maria Victoria // Journal of Democracy. – 2008. – Vol. 19. – № 2. – P. 16-30.
12. Mustapic A. M. Argentina – Del Partido Peronista al Partido Justicialista. Las Transformaciones de un partido carismatico / Ana Maria Mustapic // Cavarozzi M. i Abal Medina J.M. eds. El asedio a la politica – los partidos latinoamericanas en la era neoliberal – Buenos Aires: Homo sapiens Ediciones, 2002. – P. 137-161.
13. Petras J., Veltmeyer H. What's Left in Latin America? Regime Change in New Times / James Petras, Henry Veltmeyer – Ashgate, Farnham, Burlington: 2009. – 256 p.
14. Schamis H. A "Left Turn" in Latin America – Populism, socialism and democratic institutions / Hector Schamis // Journal of Democracy. – 2006. – Vol. 17 (4). – № 17. – P. 20-34.
15. Stokes S. Globalization and the Left in Latin America / Susan C. Stokes [Electronic resource] – Mode of access: http://www.yale.edu/macmillanreport/resources/Stokes_GlobalizationLeft.pdf
16. The "New Left" and Democratic Governance in Latin America / Ed. by Arson C., Perales J. R. [Electronic resource] : Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. – Washington, 2007. – Mode of access: <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/NewLeftDemocraticGovernance.pdf>
17. Vacs A. Argentina / Aldo C. Vacs // Politics of Latin America: The Power Game / Vanden H., Prevost G. – New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. – P. 399-436.

Кос-Станішич Л. Нові ліві у сучасному світі – випадок Латинської Америки

У статті представлено таке явище у Латинській Америці як нові ліві, що перебувають при владі у восьми з 18 демократичних держав в регіоні. Використовуючи приклади з діяльності ліво-орієнтованих президентів, автор аналізує політику помірних і радикальних лівих. Як окремий випадок розглядається політика “кіршнерізма” в Аргентині, що поєднує в собі елементи як поміркованих, так і радикальних лівих.

Ключові слова: нові ліві, Латинська Америка, “кіршнерізм”

Кос-Станішич Л. Новые левые в современном мире – случай Латинской Америки

В статье представлено такое явление в Латинской Америке как новые левые, находящиеся у власти в восьми из восемнадцати демократических государств региона. Используя примеры деятельности лево-ориентированных президентов, автор анализирует политику умеренных и радикальных левых. Как частный случай рассматривается политика “киршнеризма” в Аргентине, сочетающая в себе элементы как умеренных, так и радикальных левых.

Ключевые слова: новые левые, Латинская Америка, киршнеризм

* *
*

Стаття професора Загребського університету Лідії Кос-Станішич присвячена проблемі піднесення нових лівих сил, а також висхідним та низхідним тенденціям їх розвитку на політичній арені країн Латинської Америки. Дана проблематика є актуальною серед дослідників, які вивчають означений регіон, а також серед тих, хто займається вивченням лівого спектру політичних сил у сучасному світі.

Тенденція приходу до влади у країнах Латинської Америки нових лівих розпочалася у Венесуелі у 1998 р., піком цього стали події 2009 р., коли означені сили прийшли до влади у 12 з 20 країн регіону, які формально вважалися демократіями. Після того, ця тенденція пішла на спад. У серпні 2012 р. нові ліві залишилися при владі тільки у 8 країнах регіону.

Спираючись на напрацювання інших науковців, автор вказує на наступні основні причини піднесення нових лівих: невдоволення виборців якістю демократії; зростання нерівності та бідності; розчарування демократичними інститутами (зокрема партіями); неможливість створення відповідних механізмів участі, представництва та відповідальності у політичному житті країни; вплив глобалізації на внутрішню та зовнішню політику.

Авторка відзначає, що через те, що політика “нових” лівих у Латинській Америці відрізняється від політики “старих” лівих та режиму братів Кастро та сандіністів, тому дослідники пропонують різні види їх класифікації. Л. Кос-Станішич вважає за потрібне використовувати поділ нових лівих на “поміркованих” та “радикальних”. У статті надано детальне тлумачення такої класифікації та їх характеристики. Авторка також вказує на головні причини того, чому в одних країнах регіону до влади прийшли помірковані, а в інших – радикальні ліві. Так, помірковані нові ліві є при владі у Бразилії, Уругваї та Чилі (до 2010 р.), у той час як у Болівії (Ево Моралес), Венесуелі (Уго Чавес), Еквадорі (Рафаель Корреа) та Нікарагуа (Даніель Отрега) правлячими є радикальні ліві. Окрім того, особливий варіант представляють нові ліві Аргентини (а саме подружжя Кіршнерів) – через те, що їх політика знаходиться між поміркованими та радикальними.

Помірковані ліві виникли у стабільних та ефективних (дієвих) державах з низьким рівнем корупції та різноплановою економікою. Вони з’явилися завдяки процесам де-радикалізації лівих сил та їх своєрідного повороту до традицій центру політичного спектру, підтримуючи ринкові реформи та крах комунізму наприкінці 1980-х – на початку 1990-х рр. Нові ліві у Бразилії, Уругваї та Чилі стали складовою високо інституціоналізованої партійної системи та налагодили співробітництво з опозицією.

Радикальні ліві прийшли до влади у державах, багатих на енергетичні джерела (нафта та природний газ), але із високим рівнем нестабільності, неефективності та корупції. Ці сили є більш “молодими”, якщо порівнювати з поміркованими, та вони є партіями та рухами вождистського типу, що виникли на уламках партійної системи як сили опозиції щодо неолібералізму та представницької демократії, тому вони перебувають у постійному конфлікті з нинішньою опозицією. Авторка більш детально характеризує основні риси радикальних лівих на прикладі політики Чавеса, Моралеса, Ортеги та Корреа, відзначаючи їх спільні риси.

Особливу увагу у статті приділено такому явищу у політичному житті однієї з країн Латинської Америки “кіршнерізм” (за прізвиськом подружньої пари Нестора (2003-2007) та Крістіни (2007-2011, 2011-дотепер) Кіршнерів, яка обіймає посаду президента Аргентини з 2003 р.). Автор статті аналізує головні складові їх внутрішньої та зовнішньої політики, відзначаючи, що політичний розвиток Аргентини нагадує стратегію поміркованих лівих, у той час як соціально-економічна політика набагато ближче до ліворадикальної. Тому Л. Кос-Станішич погоджується з тими дослідниками, які розташовують правління Кіршнерів між поміркованими та радикальними лівими.

В цілому, стаття буде цікавою для тих, хто вивчає сучасну Латинську Америку, історію її політичного розвитку наприкінці ХХ – на початку ХХІ ст., нові ліві політичні сили у сучасному світі.

М. М. Бессонова