engleski

Externalism and the Transcendental Situation of Semantics

The paper analyses the conditions of possibility of empirical investigation of meaning as a basis for a critique of semantic externalism. There are two basic ways of doing semantics: the denotational and the conceptualist way. Whatever the approach chosen, the sematicist cannot avoid assuming the omniscient position, seeing our words/concepts and things "from the outside". Externalism is treated here as a specific, philosophical interpretation of denotational semantics. The basic externalist thesis is formulated thus: the reference of (some of) our terms is determined by the environment by way of causal contact between the cognitive system and the environment. The critique of externalism focuses on three points: the alleged causal links are too many ; or not there at all ; or not the right ones. It follows that causal links are neither necessary nor sufficient to fix reference. We can be said to refer successfully, but this cannot be accounted for by the causal link story. The externalist thinks he can just point to the links that purportedly fix the reference of (some of) our terms, but he is actually privileging certain links in order to ensure the "fixing of reference". Externalism is therefore an abuse of the omniscient observer position.

externalism; transcendental; semantics

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