engleski

Institutional Design in Divided Democracies

The author presents the postulate of unity in diversity as the crux of any federalist theory. Recognition of a dialectic tension between plurality and unity, two opposing poles, suggests that federalism ceases to exist not only when unity disappears, but also when diversity does. Political life in a federal system is defined by a conflict of forces, and a permanent and dynamic balance of these opposing forces characterizes the federal system. Along with that element, structuring the federal idea there is another element pertaining to the mode of its institution. We are talking about the consensual basis of all federations. Federations are created through the will of political units for association, and the expression of this will takes shape in the form of a federal agreement, politically in the idea of federal freedom. The author presents the contemporary American federalist doctrine, as well as research into the repeated military conflicts in various states in the second half of the 20th Century, and concludes that after independence wars a division of state becomes a more efficient solution than alternative institutions, regarding reduction of risks of repeated violence and insurance of a life in a democratic order, provided that the division is instituted by creating separate independent states.

constitutional law; institutional design; divided democracies; war; accomodation; division

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