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Estetika kao apodiktična disciplina: Deleuze između Kanta i Bergsona

Gilles Deleuze used to say that in order to understand a philosopher one must reconstruct the problems his concepts are a response to, and say explicitly what “the philosopher must have taken for granted, what he didn’t say but is nonetheless present in what he did say”. The aim of this paper is to do precisely this, to make explicit (almost) everything that is implicit in one short but crucial passage from the first chapter of Deleuze’s masterpiece Difference and Repetition. The passage in question states that the division of aesthetics, after Kant, into a theory of the sensible, on the one hand, and a theory of the beautiful, on the other, can be resolved only by determining the conditions not of possible but of real experience. Our explication of this seemingly simple but virtually infinitely complicated passage will begin with a short overview of the main problems and concepts of Immanuel Kant and Henri Bergson to which Deleuze obviously but implicitly refers to. Using the resources devised in the first part, the second part of the paper will then consist of a slow and careful reading of Deleuze’s own intriguing claims. By focusing our attention on a few other places in the book where Deleuze explicitly discusses aesthetics, we will find out that by determining the conditions of real experience, aesthetics becomes an apodictic discipline. The third and final part of the paper will show that all the attention paid to a single passage was not exaggerated, and it will do so by demonstrating, first, that the problem of determining the conditions of real experience is the main problem of the whole book, and, second, that aesthetics as an apodictic discipline is nothing less than one of the names of Deleuze’s metaphysical project as a whole.

Gilles Deleuze, Imanuel Kant, Henri Bergson, uvjeti stvarnog iskustva, estetika kao apodiktična disciplina

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