engleski

Competing models of decision–making in parliamentary systems: The core executive vs. the concept of presidentialization

In this paper I shall theorize two competing models of decision making in parliamentary systems – the core executive model which emphasizes the importance of networks and policy communities and the concept of presidentialization which stresses the prime ministerial predominance within a changing structure of parliamentary systems. The core executive model is based on the assumption that the executive government “consists of a number of interdependent, interacting actors and institutions within numerous overlapping, interlocking networks” and that key actors are dependent upon each other because all parts of the core executive have resources. Political power in this sense is relational category because actors have to cooperate in decision making process and no one has supremacy over the others. The concept of presidentialization on the other hand points out that power is not just relational, but also locational because it is important to identify “where actors are to be found within the core executive and whether they are at the centre or the periphery of key core executive networks”. This model establishes prime ministerial predominance within the executive which is based on prime minister’s personal and institutional resources. The concept of presidentialization sets actors and institutions in hierarchical relations where power and resources are unevenly distributed and where the prime minister achieves dominance over the executive.

Models of decision-making; Core Executive; Concept of Presidentialization

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