Williamson's Ordinarism vs. Inferentialism (CROSBI ID 562785)
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Podaci o odgovornosti
Smokrović, Nenad
engleski
Williamson's Ordinarism vs. Inferentialism
In his book “Philosophy of Philosophy”, in chapters 3 and 4, T. Williamson argues against philosophical position he calls inferentialism. In those chapters titled ‘Metaphysical conception of Analyticity’ and ‘Epistemological Conception of Analyticity’ Williamson sets fort and criticize the doctrine that analytical propositions has special status in philosophy arguing (in chapter 3) that their truth conditions are basically the same as in the case of synthetic propositions and (in chapter 4) that their grasping or understanding conditions are not special as well. I will call Williamson’s position ordinarizm and argue that it has any adventage over inferentialism.
Analiticity ; inferentialism ; analitic sentence ; conceptual competence
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Podaci o skupu
"Mind, Word and Action"
pozvano predavanje
01.09.2009-05.09.2009
Dubrovnik, Hrvatska