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Od Charlesa Schmitta do Jamesa Hankinsa: Promjene u prikazu Petrićeve filozofije u engleskim sveučilišnim udžbenicima i priručnicima (1988.-2007.)

Kad je Charles Schmitt iznenada umro 1986. godine, dva njegova velika projekta nisu bila dovršena, a oba su smjerala prema novom sintetičkom prikazu renesansne filozofije. Prvi je bio pri samom kraju: The Cambridge History of Renaissance philosophy (1988), a drugi tek u nacrtu, s djelomice napisanim prvim dvama poglavljima: Renaissance Philosophy (Oxford, 1992), pripreman zajedno s Brianom Copenhaverom. Prva je knjiga obradila renesansnu filozofiju u njezinu intelektualnom okružju i po disciplinama, a Petrićevi su filozofski uvidi obrađeni u pet poglavlja: o renesansnom razumijevanju filozofije ; novim filozofijama prirode ; astrologiji i magiji ; retorici i poetici ; napokon u poglavlju o teoriji povijesti. To je u engleskom jezičnom području prva povijest renesansne filozofije u kojoj je Petrićeva misao ocijenjena pod različitim vidicima. Očito, Panaugia i Panarchia nisu bile dostatne da bi Petrić ušao u povijest renesansne metafizike, Pampsychia i De humana philosophia da bi bio uključen u povijest renesansne psihologije i antropologije, a La città felice i Paralelli militari da bi bio spomenut u povijesti političke filozofije i etike. Petrićeva dragocjena zbirka grčkih rukopisa, koja je završila u Escorialu, i njegova rukopisna ostavština od Vaticane do Ambrosiane nisu znamenitom Cresaninu osigurale da postane prikladnim primjerom u poglavlju o renesansnim rukopisima. Kao princip organizacije za udžbenik Renaissance philosophy poslužile su »antičke filozofske tradicije koje je renesansa oživjela« (59), sa svrhom da se što bolje uoče, opišu i ocijene »razlike između aristotelizma i platonizma«. Petriću su u ovoj drugoj sintezi dodijeljene dvije važne uloge: »najznačajniji platonovac kasne renesanse« (187) i prvi, premda ne i najvažniji na popisu »novotara koji su detronizirali Aristotela« (285) u filozofiji prirode. Uz to, u poglavlju o platonizmu ponuđen je i njegov kratak filozofski portret. Ipak, filozofsko značenje Petrićeve misli stegnuto je isključivo na dva glavna filozofska djela: Discussiones peripateticae i Nova de universis philosophia. Princip organizacije, koji su pisci odabrali, dopuštao je, primjerice, da se u okvirima platonizma ili, točnije, antiaristotelizma ocijeni Petrićevo djelo Della poetica ili njegova polemika s Torquatom Tassom, ali se to nije dogodilo. Da je Petrić priredio drugi svezak za Opera omnia (1560) Giulija Camilla, da je preveo i objavio Proklova Elementa theologica et physica (1583), da je preveo i dvojezično tiskao pseudo-Aristotelovu Teologiju, Corpus Hermeticum i Oracula Chaldaica (1591), sve je to odgovaralo osnovnoj zamisli pisaca, ali taj dugotrajni i sustavni Petrićev napor za oživljavanjem zaboravljene misaone baštine Copenhaver nije primjereno ugradio u konačni tekst svoga sveučilišnog udžbenika. Kad je pak pisala poglavlje »The philosophy of the Italian Renaissance« za četvrti svezak Routledge History of Philosophy, onaj koji je pod naslovom The Renaissance and the 17th century rationalism (1993) uredio G. H. R. Parkinson, Jill Kraye bila je u posve drugačijoj situaciji od Schmitta i Copenhavera. U tijesnim okvirima jednoga poglavlja ona je na kraju svoga teksta sažeto prikazala tri kasnorenesansne filozofije prirode: Petrićevu, Telesijevu i Brunovu, upravo tim redom. U njezinu tumačenju Petrić je svojom Novom sveopćom filozofijom ponudio Papi »ficinovski amalgam platonizma, novoplatonizma i kršćanstva, s posebnim naglaskom na drevnu teologiju« (47), a unutar prirodne filozofije izdvojio se od ostalih prirodnih filozofa svojim razumijevanjem prostora i praznine. Routledge History of Philosophy ponudila je čitatelju informaciju da je Petrić važan samo zbog svoje filozofije prirode i zbog svoga filozofskoga sustava, koji je pisan kao pia philosophia a ipak je završio na katoličkom Popisu zabranjenih knjiga. A kad je, s vremenskim odmakom od Schmittovih projekata, James Hankins pripremao zbornik The Cambridge companion to Renaissance philosophy (2007), odlučio je da njegov priručnik bude »vodič za najistaknutije teme renesansne filozofije, posebno one koje su bile pretresane u recentnoj znanstvenoj literaturi« (7). Prvi se dio izdanja usredotočio na oživljavanje antičkih filozofija i transformaciju aristotelizma, a drugi se bavio izvornim renesansnim doprinosima u pojedinim filozofskim disciplinama (8): filozofiji jezika, metafizici, kozmologiji, psihologiji, etici i politici. Već je u svom »Uvodu« Hankins uvrstio Petrića u niz »novih filozofa« od Nikole Kuzanskoga do Pierrea Gassendija, koji su, oslanjajući se na zanemarene antičke filozofije, predložili cjelovite alternative aristotelizmu i izazvali kršćansko pravovjerje (5). Miguel Granada je u poglavlju »New visions of the cosmos« prikazao četiri velika prirodna filozofa kasne renesanse: Telesija, Petrića, Bruna i Campanellu, a u Petrićevoj slici svijeta uočio tri obilježja: obnovu stoičkoga i platonovskoga svemira ; »napadno tradicionalni karakter« njegova svemira unatoč inovacijama ; značajno usavršenje »Telesijeve zamisli o homogenom i neovisnom prostoru« (276-278). Odlučne su za takvu interpretaciju Petrićeve prirodne filozofije bile svježe Granadine usporedbe Petrićeva sustava s Brunovom i Telesijevom prirodnom filozofijom. Petrić je izostao u poglavljima Hankinsova Companiona o oživljavanju platonizma, psihologiji, etici i političkoj filozofiji, što bi prema urednikovoj interpretaciji imalo značiti: u posljednja dva desetljeća nije došlo do bitnih novih spoznaja o Petrićevu mjestu u razvoju tih disciplina. Ovi uvidi u novom svjetlu postavljaju stara pitanja: Kako protumačiti Petrićevu misao u kasnorenesansnom i ranonovovjekovnom kontekstu? Kako Petrića smjestiti u povijest renesansne filozofije? Može li se išta promijeniti u sažetom prikazu Petrićeve filozofije? Je li opravdano Petrićevo mjesto u povijesti filozofije svesti samo na dva njegova glavna djela: Discussiones peripateticae i Nova de universis philosophia? Je li Petrić bio isključivo »novi filozof prirode«? Sva četiri proučavana izdanja ističu Petrića kao izvornog mislioca u prirodnoj filozofiji, ali Granadina interpretacija u Hankinsovu Companionu, koliko god da je kratka, nadmašuje prethodne. To bi mogao biti putokaz kako stvaralački odgovoriti i na ostala postavljena pitanja. The sudden death of Charles Schmitt in 1986 brought to a halt two of his great projects, both aimed at a new synthesis of the Renaissance philosophy. The first project was practically completed: The Cambridge History of Renaissance philosophy (1988), and the second drafted, with partially finished first two chapters: Renaissance Philosophy (Oxford, 1992), prepared in collaboration with Brian Copenhaver. The first book covers Renaissance philosophy in its intellectual context and by parts, Petrić’s views being discussed in five chapters: »The Renaissance concept of philosophy«, »The new philosophy of nature«, »Astrology and magic«, »Rhetoric and poetics«, and »The theory of history«. This is the first history of the Renaissance philosophy in the English-speaking scholarship in which Petrić’s thought has been treated under different vantage points. Apparently, Petrić’s place in the history of the Renaissance metaphysics could not have been earned by Panaugia and Panarchia, or by Pampsychia and De humana philosophia in the history of the Renaissance psychology, or by La città felice and Paralelli militari in the history of political philosophy and ethics. Petrić’s valuable collection of Greek manuscripts housed in Escorial, or his manuscript legacy filed from Vaticana to Ambrosiana have not earned him adequate prominence in the chapter on the Renaissance manuscripts. »The ancient philosophical traditions that the Renaissance revived« (59) served as the main principle of organization for the textbook Renaissance philosophy, with the purpose of a better insight, description and evaluation of the »differences between Aristotelianism and Platonism«. In this second synthesis Petrić has been awarded two important roles: »the most imposing Platonist of the late Renaissance« (187) and the first but not the most prominent among »the novatores who dethroned the Stagirite« in philosophy of nature (285). In addition, in the chapter on Platonism Petrić’s philosophical portrait has been briefly outlined. However, the philosophical scope of Petrić’s thought has been narrowed dawn to two of his major philosophical works: Discussiones peripateticae and Nova de universis philosophia. The authors’ principle of organization would have allowed, for example, within the frame of Platonism or, more accurately, anti-Aristotelianism the assessment of Petrić’s work Della poetica or his polemics with Torquato Tasso, but this we have not witnessed. The fact that Petrić had edited the second volume of Giulio Camillo’s Opera omnia (1560), translated and printed Proclus’ Elementa theologica et physica (1583), translated and printed a bilingual edition of pseudo-Aristotelian Theology, also Hermetic Corpus and Chaldaean Oracles (1591) certainly fitted the basic editorial conception of this philosophical volume, yet Petrić’s devoted and systematic effort to revive the ancient philosophies has not been given deserved credit in the final text of Copenhaver’s guide. However, while writing the chapter »The philosophy of the Italian Renaissance« for the fourth volume of Routledge History of Philosophy, the one entitled The Renaissance and the 17th century rationalism (1993), edited by G. H. R. Parkinson, Jill Kraye was in an utterly different position from that of Schmitt and Copenhaver. To the extent the synthesis allowed, at the end of her text she summarized three natural philosophies of the late Renaissance in the following order: that of Petrić, Telesio and Bruno. In her interpretation with his Nova de universis philosophia Petrić »offered the Pope a Ficinian amalgam of Platonism, Neoplatonism and Christianity, with particular emphasis given to the ancient theology« (47), and within natural philosophy distinguished himself among other natural philosophers by his understanding of space and vacuum. According to Routledge History of Philosophy, Petrić stands out for his natural philosophy and his philosophical system constructed as pia philosophia, yet his name was listed on the Index of Prohibited Books. While preparing The Cambridge companion to Renaissance philosophy (2007) from a more recent perspective, James Hankins designed it to be »a guide to the most distinctive themes and important contributions of Renaissance philosophy, especially those that have been discussed in recent scholarly literature« (7). The first part of the volume focuses on various revivals of ancient philosophy and the transformation of Aristotelianism, while the second »dwells on the original contributions of the period in the philosophy of language, metaphysics, cosmology, psychology, ethics, and politics« (8). In his »Introduction« Hankins has included Petrić among the »new philosophers« from Nicholas of Cusa to Pierre Gassendi, who, while drawing on neglected ancient philosophies, proposed comprehensive alternatives to Aristotelianism and challenged Christian orthodoxy (5). In the chapter »New visions of the cosmos«, Miguel Granada described four great natural philosophers of the late Renaissance: Telesio, Petrić, Bruno and Campanella, and in Petrić’s world picture observed three characteristics: renovation of the Stoic nad Platonic universe ; »a markedly traditional character« of Petrić’s universe in spite of his innovations ; a significant refinement of »Telesio’s conception of homogeneous and independent space« (276-278). Such interpretation of Petrić’s natural philosophy owes much to Granada’s original comparisons between Petrić’s system with the natural philosophy of Telesio and Bruno. In the chapters of Hankins’s Companion dealing with the revival of Platonic philosophy, psychology, ethics and political philosophy Petrić is not mentioned. Editor’s interpretation may lead us to the conclusion that, since 1993, no new contributions to Petrić’s place in the development of these disciplines in the Renaissance have been made. Although contemporary English textbooks and handbooks rightly include Petrić among the foremost Renaissance philosophers, these considerations cast new light on the much-raised questions: How to interpret Petrić’s thought in the context of the late Renaissance and the early modern period? How to place Petrić in the history of the Renaissance philosophy? Can any changes be made in the short survey of Petrić’s philosophy? Is it just for Petrić to earn his place in the history of philosophy by merely two of his works: Discussiones peripateticae and Nova de universis philosophia? Was Petrić no more than a »new philosopher of nature«? Without exception, the four editions under study agree that Petrić was an original thinker in natural philosophy, yet Granada’s interpretation in Hankins’s Companion, if concise, surpasses all the former. It could serve as a guideline in the future creative treatment of other open questions.

Frane Petrić; filozofija; Charles Schmitt; Brian Copenhaver; Jill Kraye; James Hankins

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