engleski

Critical comments on reductionism in physical sciences

Reductionism and emergence as two opposing concepts have been hotly debated and analysed from various viewpoints in science as well as and in other fields. On one hand it was assumed that reductionism has been so firmly entrenched and justified in physical sciences that it could be safely extended to more complex situations, e.g. in biology, including problems of life and consciousness, and even in social sciences, theology etc. This then some led to formulate and propagate far reaching conclusions outside the domain of science, i.e. concerning essentially metaphysical questions, like the existence of Creator, etc. On the other side, as was often observed and illustrated in a number of cases, this type of “strong” reductionism as a method has limited power and often fails to explain situations in more complex physical systems where new or so-called emergent phenomena occur and have to be taken into account. In this paper I show, analysing various phenomena in quantum physics, especially in condensed matter physics, that “strong” reductionism is an unworkable programme, and cannot function even in principle whenever many-body interactions occur (and in real world they always do!). But, at the same time reduction as a method gives us an essential and necessary element in our attempts to study and “understand” real world, and in the past it served as very powerful tool, so it cannot be easily dismissed. However, it is very important to observe that this reduction of a more complex system to “simpler” ones is impossible without the help of additional assumptions, reflecting some new and “emergent” properties. In other words, the dilemma “reductionism or emergence” could be resolved if we realize that what we need (and in fact are doing constantly even without being aware of it) is “reduction with (or via) emergence”.

reductionism; emergence; quantum physics

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