engleski

Referential descriptions: a case against Russell

In “ On Denoting” and subsequent writings, Russell proposed a uniform treatment of singular denoting phrases, i.e. definite descriptions, as quantified constructions. In the light of Russell– Strawson dispute over the proper treatment of descriptions, Donnellan argued that definite descriptions are ambiguous as between attributive (Russell’ s) and referential use. Although such distinction is generally accepted, ever since Donnellan introduced it in 1966, its precise nature is controversial. There are two main opposite approaches: Russellians (e.g. Neale, and Bach) maintain that Russell’ s analysis was basically correct and complete as semantic analysis, and that aforementioned ambiguity is relevant only pragmatically (thus not affecting or discrediting Russell’ s analysis). On the other hand, Referentialists (such as Wettstein and Devitt) maintain that the ambiguity suggested by Donnellan is a semantic one, and, consequently, that the analysis proposed by Russell is inadequate or incomplete. In this paper, I will examine Michael Devitt’ s defence of Referentialist position based on his Argument from Convention, particularly with regard to the recent exchange between him and Kent Bach.

attributive use; convention (argument from); definite descriptions; Donnellan's distinction; reference; referential use

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