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The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning (CROSBI ID 151929)

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Matej Sušnik The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning // Croatian journal of philosophy, Vol. IX (2009), No. 25; 91-100

Podaci o odgovornosti

Matej Sušnik

engleski

The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning

In his book Moralna spoznaja Baccarini argues that, with respect to the individual reasoning about morality, the method of reflective equilibrium is the appropriate method of moral reasoning. The starting point of my argument is Baccarini’ s refutation of Hare’ s view. As I see it, one of Baccarini’ s central arguments against Hare consists in claiming that Hare’ s approach to the amoralist objection weakens the deductive model of moral reasoning. I argue that the amoralist objection also poses a threat to the method of reflective equilibrium. At the end of the paper, I consider another view of moral reasoning which, in my view, is better suited to deal with the amoralist objection.

reflective equilibrium; amoralist; deductive reasoning; practical reasoning; rationality

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Podaci o izdanju

Vol. IX (No. 25)

2009.

91-100

objavljeno

1333-1108

Povezanost rada

Filozofija

Indeksiranost