engleski

Small Coalitions : Lightweight Collaboration for Efficient P2P Downloads

Although numerous cooperative architectures address resource distribution in flash-crowd scenarios, these architectures are not robust against heavy churn and the omnipresent selfish behavior of peers. In this paper, we address this problem and we propose a solution for efficient resource distribution in P2P networks, based on small peer coalitions. Small coalitions bridge the gap between inefficient non-cooperative and fully cooperative architectures by establishing a robust tradeoff between complexity and performance of the resource distribution. Our solution provides natural incentives for peers to self-organize in small clusters, improves resource distribution times and is highly resilient to the existing churn in P2P systems. We evaluate several coalition strategies analytically and empirically through simulations and we show that our proposed solution improves the download performance of existing single and multi-chunk resource distribution architectures (e.g., BitTorrent) by a factor of (up to) 3.

peer-2-peer; game theory; optimization

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