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The psychology of reasoning and knowledge attributions (CROSBI ID 541462)

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Čuljak, Zvonimir The psychology of reasoning and knowledge attributions // 6th European Cogress of Analytic Philosophy. Volume of Abstracts / Kukushkina, Volha & Kijania-Placek, Katarzyna (ur.). Krakov: Jagiellonian University, 2008. str. 201-201

Podaci o odgovornosti

Čuljak, Zvonimir

engleski

The psychology of reasoning and knowledge attributions

Atributor-contextualists (AC) (K. DeRose, D. Lewis, and others) maintain that the truth-values of knowledge claims vary contextually and, therefore, that the epistemic status of a belief as well as the epistemic position of a subject is a function of the contextually shifting standards for knowledge attributions. Consequently, according to AC, knowledge claims are not sensitive to the facts about the epistemic subject, but only to the context of the knowledge attributor. The advocates of AC find the supportive empirical evidence in the linguistic data provided by the contextual semantics of the verb “ know” . In this paper AC is, as usual, confronted with some invariantist objections, which are, however, supported by the empirical evidence from a different field: the evidence derives from the well-known empirical findings in cognitive psychology, e.g. in the works by P. Wason (1966), D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, A. Tversky and P. Slovic (1982), J. Holland, K. Holyoak, R. Nisbett and P. Thagard (1993). Those findings demonstrated that in various contexts people mostly do not reason according to logical or probabilistic rules, but according to heuristic principles, the reliance on which leads to systematic logical or probabilistic errors. Making inferential and probabilistic mistakes, the reasoning subjects therefore fail to acquire the inferential knowledge of the conclusions in question. Since the competence for the reasoning according to the logical or probabilistic rules is widely recognized as an invariant standard for the attribution of logical or probabilistic knowledge and also of the pertinent inferential knowledge, the presence or lack of knowledge in any of those different situations should be explained by the intrinsic facts about peoples’ psychology, their cognitive histories or their natural and cultural environments, and not by the shifting standards of knowledge attributions. The standards for the inferential knowledge attributions remain the same across the contexts even when practices in different contexts can follow some other reasoning rules (e.g. domain specific rules or pragmatic reasoning schemas). So the varying knowledge attributions in such cases depend only on the variations in the subject’ s context.

knowledge attributions; reasoning; cognitive psychology; epistemology; contextualism; invariantism

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Podaci o prilogu

201-201.

2008.

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objavljeno

Podaci o matičnoj publikaciji

6th European Cogress of Analytic Philosophy. Volume of Abstracts

Kukushkina, Volha & Kijania-Placek, Katarzyna

Krakov: Jagiellonian University

Podaci o skupu

6th European Cogress of Analytic Philosophy

predavanje

21.08.2008-26.08.2008

Kraków, Poljska

Povezanost rada

Filozofija