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Pregled bibliografske jedinice broj: 252908

Testimony and Perception

Prijić - Samaržija, Snježana
Testimony and Perception // Acta Analytica, Epistemology and other issues (1996), 16-17; 201-212 (podatak o recenziji nije dostupan, članak, znanstveni)

Testimony and Perception

Prijić - Samaržija, Snježana

Acta Analytica (0353-5150) Epistemology and other issues (1996), 16-17; 201-212

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Radovi u časopisima, članak, znanstveni

Ključne riječi
Testimony; perception; epistemic status; inferential status

C.A.J. Coady ascribes the equally primitive epistemic status to testimony and perception. His thesis grounded on allegedly direct and non-inferential nature of both perception and testimony. Precisely, Coady builds his anti-reductionism on the comparison between perception and testimony geared to establishing their equality with regard to (primitive) epistemic status: the testimony is as direct and non-inferential as perception. Unfortunately, he does not precisely determine the meaning of these crucial concepts. We offer several ways of making it precise. Our purpose is to show that vagueness, at first glance nonessential, hides serious inconsistencies in his epistemology of testimony.

Izvorni jezik


Autor s matičnim brojem:
Snježana Prijić-Samaržija, (230955)

Uključenost u ostale bibliografske baze podataka:

  • The Philosopher's Index
  • Repertoire bibliographique de la philosophie
  • Urlich's Periodicals Directory