Between Reason and Voluntarism Scotus, Böhme, Fichte, Hegel (CROSBI ID 340204)
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Podaci o odgovornosti
Buterin, Damir
Smith, Nicholas H.
engleski
Between Reason and Voluntarism Scotus, Böhme, Fichte, Hegel
I had begun doctoral dissertation with the considering of the philosophies of John Duns Scot (c1270-1308) and Jakob Böhme (1575-1621). The reason for which I compared them with Fichte and Hegel is that I wished to suggest that some of the ideas of these pre-Kantian thinkers recur, though in rather different form, in the systems of two post-Kantian thinkers. Moreover, I wished to prove how Duns Scot and Böhme partly anticipate Fichte and Hegel in their « ; discovering» ; the sources of our cognitive abilities, theoretical and practical, in self-determining free will. In the first part of the dissertation I presented intellectual horizons of Duns Scot and Böhme like guidelines of that what follows. In the second part I concentrated exclusively on the Jena period of Fichte's philosophical activity, i.e. on Groundwork of all Wissenschaftslehre and new method lectures about Wissenschaftslehre. I considered the attentivness of Fichte's general theory of knowledge, and his understanding of practical reason and I tried to interpolate the concept of the will in his version of « ; transcendental idealism» ; . More or less I did the same in the third part of the dissertation considering Hegel's philosophy of « ; absolute idealism» ; considering mainly his Science of Logic and the third part of Encyclopaedia of Philosophical sciences.
John Duns Scot; Jakob Böhme; Fichte; Hegel; free will; theory of knowledge; practical reason
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17.08.2004.
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Sydney