engleski

Externalism and the pragmatic dimension of knowledge

In this paper I argue that externalism involves the recognition of the essentially pragmatic character of knowledge and is therefore committed to a pragmatic stance toward knowledge. Mainly concentrating on Dretske’ s externalist views, I try to show that his two main and complementary strategies, relevant alternatives approach (Dretske 1970, 1981b) and his brand of indicator and process reliabilism (Dretske / Enc 1984, Dretske 1990, 1991) rely crucially on pragmatic observations and arguments, but these do not make his externalist position viable, at least not in the theory of propositional knowledge as it is commonly understood (by Dretske, too) and pursued. Dretske’ s RA strategy does not avoid the Charibdis of the modified generality problem. On the other side, his pragmatic strategy in the framework of his reliabilist approach ends up on Scylla of Ryle’ s distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how. Through an implicit application of this distinction, Dretske finds in the latter the basis for his epistemological program. So his unambiguous externalism, being essentially pragmatist, disqualifies itself as a theory of propositional (factual) knowledge.

externalism; knowledge; pragmatic dimension; Dretske; relevant alternatives; knowledge-how

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