engleski

Inferencing in the construction of meaning

A major insight of (Neo-)Gricean pragmatics and relevance theory is that the production and comprehension of (utterance) meaning is based on inferential abilities of interlocutors (see Levinson 2000 ; Sperber and Wilson 1995). Cognitive linguistics must also concern itself with the role of inferences in meaning construction and the problem of how communicative intentions can be recognized. I argue that conceptual metonymy is an important inferential tool in the construction of meaning. More specifically I contend that (i) metonymic reasoning underlies much (though perhaps not all) of what is said (explicature) and of what is implicated ; (ii) the metonymic relation between source and target is contingent though often not defeasible in the Gricean sense ; (iii) metonymic principles are relevant for an adequate understanding of grammatical and conceptual structure ; and (iv) the ubiquity of metonymy calls into question the strict dividing line between semantics and pragmatics assumed by Gricean pragmatics and relevance theory.

relevance theory; conceptual metonymy; inferences

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