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Explanatory Power of Leibnizian Principles in Modern Physics

The potential use of Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason and his principle of compossibility, as applied to competing physical models or theories, in debating meaning of modern physical theories is re-assessed. The main hypothesis is that although physics was over centuries gaining in predictive power, this was not always so regarding its explanatory power. The principle of causality alone seems not to be able to satisfy as the ultimate principle when giving explanation of material phenomena. Instead, we might want to consider the role of the principle of sufficient reason in providing an explanation of not only phenomena but the laws of physics as well. Also considered is the role the principle of compossibility could have in the overall assessment of truth of physical theories and whether any of the known fundamental principles of physics could qualify for, what Leibniz calls, the law of maximum.

principle of sufficient reason ; predictive power of a physical theory ; explanatory power of a physical theory ; principle of compossibility ; Leibnizian law of maximum

Organizers: Filippo Costantini, University Ca’ Foscari of Venice/McMaster University; Jeffrey Elawani, McMaster University; Richard T.W. Arthur, McMaster University