engleski

A Metacritique of the Court of Justice of the European Union

Starting from the distinction between internal and external critique author discusses what kind of critique of the CJEU is possible, and by whom, at all. Assuming that performance of the CJEU should be measured on its own merits and not exclusively or primarily according to external comparators, author suggests that the line of critique that builds on allegedly negative synergy of renewable office, absence of docket control and lack of dissent that leads to alleged inadequacy of judicial reasoning is not only external in nature, but is refuted by specific procedural mechanisms and internal structures that provide for sufficient legitimacy and functional adequacy. Author dismisses arguments according to which the CJEU always promotes Europeanizing outcomes and suggests that reasoning of the Court is informed by the specific ontology of the EU. Author questions adequacy of the critique of the CJEU by introducing arguments of cultural relativism, which deny normative claims to universal validity of putatively more desirable political and legal practices and concludes that internal critique of adjudication based on functions and ontology of European Union law is more productive then external one.

Metacritique ; Court of Justice ; European Union

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