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Philosophical Canon and the Truth: Challenges from The No-Progress View Of Philosophy

Intuitively, we can think of philosophical canon as consisting of those philosophers who, throughout the history, developed philosophical systems of significant, timeless value and relevance for the humanity. Thus, from Plato and Aristotle to Descartes, Locke, Hume and Spinoza, to Kant in analytic, or Hegel and other German- idealists in continental tradition, these (add some, leave out some others) are the philosophers worthy of continual, repeated consideration. We teach their views in schools, we focus on their teachings at the universities, and we do so because we believe there is something of everlasting value and relevance in what they said. Independently of some contentious inclusions/exclusions from the canon, when it comes to philosophy, this is the core of what one should study. We should wonder however, how do we decide what makes someone’s views worthy of such canonical status. In literature, we tend to think that the canon is composed of those whose writings have the highest literary excellence. If excellence within the relevant domain is the criterion for inclusion, we should then consider what makes something a philosophical excellence. One obvious candidate is the truth: since philosophy has always identified itself as the search for the truth, we might think that those who actually found some truth deserve to be included into the canon. They are the ones who achieved philosophical excellence and should be praised for their greatness. However, for many philosophers on our initial list, it is hard to see where the truth is in their respective systems. Plato was most likely wrong about the realm of ideas (not to mention about emotions, arts and state organization), Aristotle wrongly believed in inherent inadequacy of women (not to mention his views on slavery), and Descartes got it so very wrong with the topic he cared so much about, the mind-body dualism. When it comes to truth, these philosophers were very much very wrong. Still, we hold on to them tightly and believe they are the prime examples of philosophical greatness. For some, this is a big problem. As the advocates of the No-progress view tend to say, unlike every other science, philosophy does not discard those of its practitioners who got something wrong. Consequently, they argue, philosophy either does not aim to discover the truth, or it does so in some very confusing way. Neither of these options is acceptable to philosophers, and we end up with a problem: how are we to explain the value of philosophy, if the best among us were so wrong on so many things? Why are we imposing the canon, if the canon is so riddled with what is untrue? Is there, as the most pressing challenge would have it, a place for philosophy in contemporary society, culture and education, in light of its repeated embrace of those who did not get it right? My aim here is to address these challenges. To do so, I examine some of the most highly respected philosophers throughout the history, and I offer an explanation of the fact that, even though their systems may be imbued with some mistakes, they are nevertheless prime examples of philosophical greatness. While I do raise some cautionary comments regarding the formation of the canon itself, I argue that there is more than truth to philosophical greatness ; I elaborate on this claim and I conclude that philosophy, even when divorced from the truth, has a lot to contribute to the society. The canon has its value, but that value is not to be measured only by truth.

No progress view of philosophy, canon, philosophy, truth, value of philosophy

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