engleski

The explanatory limits of predictive processing: self-deception and the personal/subpersonal distinction

The prediction error minimization framework (PEM) denotes a family of views that aim at providing a unified theory of perception, cognition, and action. In this paper, I discuss some of the theoretical limitations of PEM. Despite its ability to illuminate some aspects of the formation of self-deceptive beliefs, it appears that PEM cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of self-deception because its cognitive ontology does not have a separate category for motivational states such as desires. However, it might be thought that this objection confuses levels of explanation. Self-deception is a personal level phenomenon, while PEM offers subpersonal explanations of psychological abilities. Thus, the paper examines how subpersonal explanations couched in the PEM framework can be thought of as related to personal level explanations underlining self- deception. In this regard, three views on the relation between personal and subpersonal explanations are investigated: the autonomist, functionalist, and co-evolutionary perspective. I argue that no matter which of the three views is used to think about the relation between PEM and personal level explanations, the PEM paradigm faces serious explanatory limitations when it comes to explaining self-deception.

Desires ; motivation ; predictive processing ; personal/subpersonal explanations ; self-deception

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