engleski

Axiomatic approach to the notion of compromise

In this paper we will follow the line of thought presented by Chatterji, Sen and Zeng (2016) and form a weak and strong version of a compromise axiom, one that should capture understanding of compromise based on an ability to elect a winner which is not top-ranked in any preference on a profile. After that we will analyze an interaction of those axioms and three major groups of social choice functions: position scoring functions, Condorcet functions and a group of social choice functions that aim to capture a notion of compromise (Sanver (2004) and Hatzivelkos (2019)). Finally, we will show that the division of social choice functions in three groups with respect to these axioms (ones that fail to satisfy weak compromise axiom, ones which meet weak, but not strong compromise axiom, and ones that satisfy strong compromise axiom) fairly reflect relationship between those social choice functions and colloquial expectations from notion of compromise.

Compromise ; Compromise axiom ; Positional scoring rules ; Compromise rules ; d-Measure of Compromise

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