engleski

Predictive Processing, Self-Deception, and the Distinction Between Personal and Subpersonal Explanations

Prediction error minimization framework (PEM) denotes a family of theories and models that aim to provide a unified account of perception, cognition, and action. According to some of its supporters, PEM’ ambitions are very broad, aiming to account for “perception and action and everything mental in between”. In this talk I will discuss some of the theoretical limitations of the PEM paradigm. As a case study I will use self- deception. It appears that PEM cannot adequately account for self-deception because it reduces its cognitive ontology to constructs such as precisions, predictions, and prediction errors without a separate category for motivational states such as desires. In the talk I will discuss a potential response to this objection that is based on a distinction between personal and subpersonal levels of explanation. Self-deception is a personal level phenomenon, while PEM offers subpersonal explanations of cognitive function. So, to claim that PEM is unable to explain self- deception might be based on a confusion between the levels of explanation. It will be discussed how the plausibility of this response depends on the construal of the relation between personal and subpersonal levels of explanation. There are at least three views on the relation between personal and subpersonal explanations: the autonomist, the functionalist, and the co- evolutionary perspective. Taking into account these perspectives, I discuss a potential dilemma for PEM with respect to its (in)ability to explain self-deception. On the one hand, adopting the autonomist perspective might insulate PEM from the objection, but at the cost of extremely limiting its ability to shed light on personal level phenomena. Adopting the functionalist or co- evolutionary perspective, on the other hand, leaves PEM open to the objection that it cannot appropriately explain self-deception and similar forms of motivated reasoning.

PRediction error minimization ; self-deception ; motivated reasoning ; persona/subpersonal explanations

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