engleski

Is psychopathy a disability? The neuroscientific findings on antisocial behavior and the ordinary notion of a person

The study of the social impact of psychopathy should be and has been paired with investigations of the relevant ethical and legal dimensions. So far, empirical studies have mostly considered such responses within the scope of the criminal justice system (Kiehl and Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013). Consequently, the focus of earlier ethical and legal research was on how emotional and cognitive impairments that are correlated with psychopathy may affect the legal and moral accountability of the psychopathic offender (Kiehl and Sinnott- Armstrong, 2013 ; Malatesti & ; McMillan, 2010). A review of the literature indicates that the various emotional and cognitive peculiarities of psychopaths do not undermine their criminal responsibility (Jurjako and Malatesti, 2018). Relevant for this context is the multifaceted nature of psychopathy and its intricate relationship with antisocial behaviour that introduces an additional layer of complexity in the interpretation of empirical findings (Brazil et al., 2018). Recently, however, researchers have begun investigating the impact of community- dwelling individuals with elevated psychopathic tendencies in other settings besides that of criminal justice, such as in the corporate world (Babiak et al., 2010 ; Babiak and Hare, 2006 ; Boddy, 2011). In this paper, we will take an empirically informed philosophical perspective to reflect on so far neglected legal/ethical issues that arise from the latter research. We will consider whether community dwelling psychopaths have disabilities that legally or ethically would recommend specific responses. Although the emotional and cognitive disturbances seen in psychopathy have no definite implications for their moral or legal accountability, these disturbances are likely to play central roles in explaining their interpersonally maladaptive behaviors (Blair et al., 2005 ; Koenigs and Newman, 2013). These behaviors, even if not necessarily criminal, affect how other people perceive psychopathic individuals and respond to them (Lilienfeld, 2013). Specifically, if the emotional and cognitive impairments related to psychopathy are regarded as disabilities they might even grant special protective rights, as in the case of other disabilities (United Nations, 2006). For instance in the workplace, individuals with psychopathic tendencies might have a right not to be discriminated against and, instead, to have appropriate surrounding conditions that would minimise the possibility to harm others. To establish whether core psychopathic traits constitute a disability that should ground certain rights in non-clinical contexts, we will consider two issues. The first one is normative, and requires clarifying when a cognitive or emotional impairment can be labeled a disability (Shoemaker, 2010 ; Wasserman et al., 2016). We will argue that an impairment is a disability that grants special protective rights if it is i) not remediable and ii) affects the autonomy of the person. Autonomy refers to the ability of a person to act in accordance with personal reasons and motives. The second issue is whether the available scientific evidence on emotional and cognitive impairments are sufficient for drawing the conclusion that psychopaths indeed suffer disabilities of this kind. We will argue that currently available neuropsychological evidence does not warrant thinking that psychopathic individuals suffer from irremediable autonomy affecting cognitive and emotional disabilities. Accordingly, psychopathic individuals should not be granted special rights like other individuals with disability.

Psychopathy ; disability ; antisocial behaviour ; neuroscientific data ; ordinary notion of.a person

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