engleski

Belief versus probability: Individual differences in meta-reasoning

Modern models of dual-processing propose that parallel Type 1 processes cue responses during reasoning which may or may not be in conflict. If conflict is detected it may be resolved through acceptance of the dominant Type 1 response (rationalization), by abandoning the dominant response (decoupling) or by formulating a third alternative. Meta-reasoning research has shown conflict detection and resolution have significant effects on both response time and metacognitive monitoring outcomes. Conflict generally prolongs response times and decreases metacognitive judgments such as confidence. Recent studies within the dual-process approach have shifted towards research of individual differences in meta-reasoning. Particularly, differences in sensitivity to, and resolution of, conflict. Our goal was to investigate differences in meta-reasoning depending on which Type 1 process was dominant in a simple Base rate task. Participants (N = 55) were presented with a description of a person (e.g. person A is attractive) after which they were presented information about a group (e.g. the group consists of 870 models and 130 teachers). Finally, participants had to decide to which cohort does a person randomly chosen from the group belong, and provide a metacognitive judgment of confidence. The task can be manipulated so that belief (stereotypes) and probability (base rates) lead to congruent or conflicted responses. Based on responses in conflict versions we divided the sample into a belief and probability dominant group. We conducted 2(congruence) by 2(group) ANOVAs on response time and confidence measures. Results showed that while conflict prolonged response times for both groups (main effect of congruence F(1, 53) = 43.30, p < .01, ηp2 = .45), the effect was larger in the probability dominant group (interaction effect F(1, 53) = 8.64, p < .01, ηp2 = .14). However, there was no difference in the magnitude of the congruence effect on confidence between the groups (only a main effect of congruence F(1, 53) = 57.66, p < .01, ηp2 = .52). Results show probability dominant participants detected the conflict more often and/or that resolving the conflict was more difficult, implying a prevalence of decoupling rather than rationalization but this was not reflected in metacognitive judgments. These results show that the relationship between reasoning and metacognition is more complex and is subject to individual differences to a greater degree than was previously thought.

reasoning ; reasoning strategies ; meta-reasoning ; individual differences

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