engleski

Moral Autonomy and Ethical Life. Hegel's Critique of Kant's Conception of Practical Subjecitvity

After outlining Kant's conception of practical subjectivity and finding its foundation in his notion of moral autonomy, the article focuses on Hegel’s critique of Kantian moral philosophy in the “Philosophy of Right”. The main part of the article deals with the reasons for which Hegel considers “Ethical life” as an actualization of moral autonomy and an overcoming of some of its deficiencies at the same time. “Ethical life” is comprised of institutions and practices of collective life in which reason is historically actualized, but which are not at the disposal of individuals, i.e. which have objective validity for them. At the same time, they allow for the realisation of the private ends of the individuals. Furthermore, as these institutions and practices necessitate mutual interdependence of individuals in attainment of their particular ends and realisation of their welfare, they contribute to the fulfilment of Kantian “ends that are at the same time duties”. The last part of the article explores some important “ethical” inadequacies of “civil society” with respect to the demands of moral autonomy.

Kant ; Hegel ; moral autonomy ; ethical life ; practical subjectivity

nije evidentirano