Rule of Recognition and Methods of Interpretation (CROSBI ID 689030)
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Podaci o odgovornosti
Burazin, Luka
engleski
Rule of Recognition and Methods of Interpretation
It is sometimes claimed (in Anglo-American jurisprudential literature) that the rule of recognition sets the criteria for identifying legal norms and that this, therefore, means that canons of interpretation are also part of these criteria. Such a view then faces the problem of theoretical disagreements that call into question the rule of recognition itself and legal positivistic accounts of law. The paper argues that the rule of recognition sets the criteria only for sources of law and not legal norms themselves and that a theory of interpretation that distinguishes between normative texts (sources of law) and legal norms (as meanings of legal texts) can help explain why the rule of recognition might still be conceived as a conventional rule based on the convergent practice of officials and the fact that officials sometimes disagree about the correct interpretation of legal texts.
rule of recognition, legal interpretation, sources of law, theoretical disagreements
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Podaci o prilogu
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Podaci o skupu
LegArg Conference “Modern Legal Interpretation: Legalism or Beyond?“
pozvano predavanje
18.11.2016-19.11.2016
Ljubljana, Slovenija