engleski

When EU Political Convergence Fails: Corporate versus Party State Capture in Croatia and Post- Socialist New Member States

Although we rely only on the control of corruption indicator in order to identify potential cases of capture, we offer novel state-capture proxies such as indices based on BEEPS and ParlGov data, with the goal of differentiation between corporate and party state capture cases. In addition, our definition of state capture covers both costly and particularistic extraction of resources by the state from society at large and extraction of resources from the state by corrupt elite. Our main thesis is that countries avoiding both variants of capture achieved political convergence while the rest of the sample did not share their fortune. Our findings do not refute the classification introduced by Innes but we shed a new light on the underlying mechanisms of capture at work, provide new measures of state capture and explain their role in the crisis of political convergence. This is our original contribution to the existing literature.

EU, corporate state capture, party state capture, democracy, governance

nije evidentirano