engleski

Civic friendship, Affiliation and Social Justice

The paper aim to reconsider Aristotle's notion of civic friendship situated in the context of contemporary, plural societies as a model for social and political relationship between citizens. Since the main characteristics of Aristotle’s civic friendship are concern for other’s well-being for the sake of others and some kind of concord in regards to commonly recognized good, such notion appears to be more suitable for communitarianism rather than liberal political theories. Here we propose a reading of Aristotelian civic friendship that is compatible with liberal framework, that however keeps Aristotle’s notions of mutual well-wishing and common good. In our view this can be done within Nussbaum’s version of capability approach where she gives a list of central capabilities. The list establishes what she calls ‘a thick vague theory of good’ that is thick because it gives us a content of human good, but is vague because it leaves up to individuals how they are going to manifest or realize it. Civic friendship in our view thus becomes mutual concern for the development of one’s capabilities, while development of such society is common good. This mutual concern is realised through common political institutions, but also supported by fellow citizens who develop dispositions to act friendly towards their fellow citizens. Such reading of Aristotle’s civic friendship allows that civic friends might differ in their comprehensive doctrines of good and in their visions of ideal society but are motivated with the same goal, i.e. common good: to live in a society that provides for each member to achieve life worth of human dignity and as such serves as a precondition for stability and security to convert capabilities into real functionings in a long term.

Aristotle, civic friendship, social justice, affiliation

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