engleski

Are Psychopaths Harmed by Their Condition

While the issue of harmfulness of psychopaths to the rest of society has been relatively well explored (Hare, 1998 ; Davis-Barron, 1995 ; Kiehl & Hoffman, 2011) the question of whether psychopathy is harmful for psychopaths themselves has not received much attention. The issue, however, is worth addressing because settling it could have considerable theoretical and practical consequences. In fact, it could guide us in formulating and normatively justifying the types of appropriate intervention concerning those individuals. Specifically, in the context of the debate of psychopaths' mental illness status, the harm requirement is a central component of both normativist and hybrid naturalist views on mental illness. (Jurjako, 2019 ; Malatesti, 2014 ; Nadelhoffer & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013). The main thesis of this paper is that on the grounds of an account of harm, one closely tied to a conception of well-being, psychopathy is a harmful condition. I will proceed as follows. First, I will argue that we can elaborate a notion of harm that could be useful in the debate on psychopathy by relying on an account of well-being, while also considering the available clinical descriptions and empirical data concerning the condition of psychopathy. Important components of this account are some notions that have been elaborated within the discussion of well-being and disability. (Campbell & Stramondo, 2017), and in the investigation of self-harm (McAllister, 2003) The notion of harm will be investigated through the prism of the value fulfillment theory of well- being proposed by Valerie Tiberius (Tiberius, 2018). This is a subjective theory that has values and their fulfillment, together with the regulative ideal of appropriate values, as its key components.

psychopathy ; antisocial personality disorder ; harm ; well-being ; values ; harmful dysfunction ; PCL-R

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