engleski

Minimization of the d-measure of divergence from the compromise

This work is based on a mathematical model for description of a compromise as a version of Sorites paradox within social choice theory. We will present a way to minimize d-measure of divergence from compromise: minimization over all possible permutations of candidates. We show that this function satisfies strict Pareto principle for all levels of compromise (that is, for all d>1). Furthermore, we prove that such minimization is positively responsive in three candidates scenario for d=2 (on the other hand, we outline construction of non-monotonic profiles for other values of d), and that in the same scenario such minimization satisfies intense independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIIA), as Saari defined it. Note that IIIA is proven to be substantial for characterization of Borda count, and this procedure is clearly different from Borda count.

social choice theory, compromise, measure of divergence from compromise

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