engleski

Are intentions necessary for self-deception? Exploring the limits of the predictive processing paradigm

The prediction error minimization (PEM) framework comprises a family of views that provide a unified account of perception, cognition, and action. In the paper, I use self-deception as a case study for exploring the limits of the PEM framework. The argument goes as follows. Self- deception presupposes the belief-desire psychology. PEM seems to eschew the concept of desire. Thus, PEM cannot capture standard cases of self- deception. However, some authors argue that intentions are necessary for explaining self- deception. It seems that PEM has resources to capture intentions, at least construed as beliefs about what one will do. I dispute the claim that intentions are necessary for self- deception. Moreover, I explore in what way this discussion indicates that a proper explanatory framework for capturing high-level phenomena such as self- deception requires reliance on psychological constructs (e.g. personality traits) that seem to outstrip the conceptual framework of the PEM paradigm.

Prediction error minimization ; self-deception ; motivated reasoning ; intentions ; the selectivity problem

nije evidentirano